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Authoritarian Member States in
International Organizations
Hungary and Romania in the European Union
Matt Barg

ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates under which conditions do authoritarian Member States
exist in International Organizations that require democratic governance in
their treaty law. The European Union is used as a case study along with two of
its Member States that are in the process of transitioning to democracy from
previous authoritarian regimes—Hungary and Romania. This thesis employs
stealth authoritarian theory to analyze how a democratizing Member State may
violate these laws and revert to authoritarian governance. It also critiques
international enforcement mechanisms to consider their effectiveness to enforce
their laws and norms as well as prevent an authoritarian reversal. Finally,
cultural internalization of IO law is analyzed in order to assess the conditions
in which a Member State’s domestic population would approve, or even call
for, undemocratic governance that violates IO law.
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Introduction
Hungary was the first Soviet-occupied state to slash a hole in the Iron Curtain when it
opened its border with Austria in 1989. Consequently, Hungary became a bastion of
democratic hope in Central and Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Since the Fidesz government gained its supermajority in Hungary’s Parliament in 2010,
however, the progress made toward establishing a democracy has been dismantled.
Hungary’s decline toward authoritarianism has illuminated weaknesses in the European
Union’s (EU) ability to enforce its fundamental values and ensure democracy in its Member
States.1
Prime Minister Orbán and the Fidesz government have maintained the illusion of
democracy Hungary; all the while, they have essentially reinstated a single-party system. The
Fidesz government drafted a new Constitution with almost no input from oppositional parties
and the public. The new Constitution, known as the Fundamental Law, was passed without
any votes from oppositional parties in Hungary’s Parliament, and the Fidesz government
found a way to circumvent the constitutionally required public debate process for the
Fundamental Law’s adoption. The Fidesez government has passed legislation without
oppositional party influence or debate, removed political checks and balances, and redefined
rule of law to suit its aspirations. This government has restructured the judiciary and
bureaucratic institutions, provided Fidesz party members with tremendous electoral
advantages, and established a means of entrenching itself into institutional frameworks for
the unforeseeable future.2 The media is under attack and forced to self-censor. Civil society

1

The Fidesz party lost its supermajority by one seat in February 2015 when a special election was
held in Veszprem to replace Tibor Navracsics, who became an EU commissioner.
2
Rule of law is defined as “The importance of the rule of law applies to all peoples, whether of a
particular, tribe, city state of the world. As the rule of law governs the behavior of individuals within
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offices and the homes of non-governmental organization (NGO) employees have been
raided. It appears that the Fidesz government has halted Hungary’s transition to democracy
for authoritarianism.
Democracy and rule of law in Romania, which borders Hungary to the east and is also
a former Soviet-occupied country, have also been in jeopardy in recent years. Democratic
hopes have remained far lower in Romania, in comparison to Hungary’s peaceful transition
after the Soviet Union lost control over the region in the late 1980s. Romania’s transition to
democracy has been tumultuous and began with the execution of its communist president,
Nicolae Ceausescu. Romania’s democratic transition has been plagued by institutional
corruption and political turmoil. In 2012, the political instability reached its pinnacle as
Prime Minister Victor Ponta attempted to impeach his chief political opponent, President
Traian Basecu. Prime Minister Ponta enacted emergency ordinances, even though there was
no legitimate emergency in Romania, to remove the Constitutional Court’s review powers.
Prime Minister Ponta also intended to remove key checks against his office and his majority
coalition’s power in Parliament. This attempt to consolidate power through extralegal means
was ultimately unsuccessful, primarily because of pressures from European Union actors.
The EU has consistently had greater influence over governance in Romania when compared
to Union’s role in Hungary. This is greatly due to the EU’s implementation of a postaccession monitoring instrument in Romania—the Certification and Verification Mechanism
(CVM)—that observes the Member State’s progress to correct major democratic
deficiencies. These major democratic deficiencies in Romania include corruption of public
officials and the independence of the judiciary. The CVM has only been applied to the 2007
a state, so does it govern the behavior of states within the international system.” Zartner, Dana.
Courts, Codes, and Customs: Legal Tradition and State Policy Toward International Human Rights
and Environmental Law (2014): 5.
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EU accession class, which included Romania and Bulgaria, and there is no monitoring tool
for Hungary or any other EU Member States.
The central question of this thesis is under which conditions does an authoritarian
Member State exist in an international organization (IO) that requires democratic governance
in its treaty law? Specifically, this thesis aims to examine the discourse surrounding
international organizations and their Member States, the effectiveness of IO enforcement
mechanisms, democratization, authoritarian reversals and Member State internalization of IO
norms. Further, the following will analyze the consequences when Member State violates the
EU’s fundamental values of democracy and rule of law, which are found Article 2 of Treaty
of the European Union, as well as the EU’s ability to prevent authoritarian reversals.
Hungary and Romania will be used as case studies. Hungary and Romania’s accession into
the EU required a certain level of democratic proficiency before the states could join the
Union. However, each country teetered on an authoritarian reversal this decade.
After being occupied by the Soviet Union for over four decades, both of these states
began democratic transitions in 1989. Hungary and Romania’s democratic progress has
waned at times. Each country has experienced egregious violations of democracy and rule of
law principles in recent years—despite their admittance to the EU and acceptance of the
supranational organization’s requirement of a certain level democracy, rule of law and
human rights compliance. First, the following will examine the Member States’ government
structures, how they have violated the EU’s fundamental values in question, and the potential
for an authoritarian reversal. Next, this thesis will analyze the EU’s institutional enforcement
mechanisms and democracy-building strategies. The final section assesses the internalization
of EU law and norms into Member States in order to understand whether the domestic
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society has adopted these norms and require public institutions to respect these norms as the
appropriate standards of behavior. The primary objective of this thesis is not to simply point
out incidents of democracy and rule of law violations but to also recognize when a Member
State is systematically creating an authoritarian government. In addition, this thesis aims to
determine the extent that an IO becomes involved and pressures a Member State to improve
its democratic performance.
Analysis should first scrutinize domestic governance practices and key democratic
institutions to determine which conditions an authoritarian Member State exists in an IO. The
first hypothesis uses stealth authoritarian theory to appraise possible authoritarian Member
States.3 Authoritarian reversals occur nearly exclusively in transitioning states that formerly
had authoritarian regimes. A transitioning state’s authoritarian reversal requires governments
to work through and undermine the democratic institutions and practices that were crafted
during its transition. Therefore, comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon requires
observation of how transitioning IO Member States undermine democracy and rule of law to
establish an authoritarian foothold. Stealth authoritarianism is a means of protecting and
entrenching power when transparent authoritarian practices are not a viable option, which
would be the case for Member States that do not wish to draw attention or hope to conceal
their violations of IO treaty law requiring democratic governance.4 There are six indicators of
stealth authoritarian governance: (1) the executive branch uses constitutional order to
dominate and partially control judicial and legislative branches; (2) those in power rewrite
laws or uses constitutional loopholes to consolidate power into the executive branch; (3)
those in power build strong formal as well as informal institutions that are filled with ruling3
4

Varol, Ozan. “Stealth Authoritarianism.” Iowa Law Review 100 (2015).
Ibid.
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party loyalists; (4) there is strong control over mass media; (5) ruling-party turnover is
obstructed by election and campaign laws that provide incumbents with unfair electoral
advantages over challengers; and, (6), there is a weak civil society.5 These sub-hypothesis,
however, are not independent. Rather, they are interactive and certain components of stealth
authoritarianism cannot be achieved until others have been completed. Despite different
means, the outcome of stealth authoritarian practices is simply authoritarianism.
The second hypothesis evaluates the role that IOs have in Member State
democratization and the effectiveness of their enforcement mechanisms. This hypothesis
estimates that IOs may be able to support transitions to democracy, but they cannot prevent
reversals to authoritarianism in transitioning Member States for the following reasons. First,
IOs direct enforcement mechanisms found in treaty law are weak and cannot force a Member
State to comply with IO rules. Also, most IOs do not have mechanisms that allow them to
intervene with military force when Member States do not comply with IO law. Second,
indirect enforcement mechanisms (economic and political pressures) from IOs do not
promote long-term democratic consolidation and do not prevent authoritarian reversals.
Finally, IOs with limited monitoring and evaluating mechanisms can fail to prevent an
authoritarian reversal. In some cases, IOs are unable to initially recognize authoritarian
reversals because monitoring and evaluating are either ineffective or do not exist.
The final hypothesis examines compliance and internalization of international law.
An authoritarian Member States exists in an international organization when the IO’s norms
have not been internalized into domestic society. Signing and ratifying treaties is only the
first step to compliance with international law. It is necessary that Member States

5

Varol, Ozan. “Stealth Authoritarianism.” Iowa Law Review 100 (2015).
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domestically internalize international law for it to become binding.6 Yet, accession into an IO
only requires surface-level internalization of international law, and the internalization process
is slow moving. This process can be disrupted or terminated in times of crisis, especially
economic crises. Political leaders often have the ability derail the internalization and
acceptance of IO norm process during these crises. As a result, democratic transitions are far
more likely to fail if the public does not believe democratic governance is the appropriate
standard of behavior from its leaders. Both the Hungarian and Romanian citizens’ faith in
democratic political leadership and democratic principles have faltered over the past decade.
The EU was created in response to World War II to promote international peace,
cooperation and economic stability in the region. In 1951, six states signed the Treaty
Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. 7 The main goal of this treaty was to
create interdependence on coal and steel so that no country could mobilize its armed forces
without others knowing.8 The Union progressed throughout the 20th century to create the
European Economic Community,9 established a consolidated European Commission and
Council,10 and continued to add Member States. The word ‘democracy’ was not mentioned in
any of the Union’s treaties until 1992 when the European Union was formally created.11
Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) established democracy, rule of law, and
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as the Union’s core values. 12 These

6

Zartner, Dana. “Internalization of International Law.” International Studies Compendium Project
(2015).
7
Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands
8
http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/index_en.htm
9
Treaties of Rome: EEC and EUROTOM Treaties (1957)
10
Merger Treaty (1965), also known as the Brussels Treaty, and the Single European Act (1986)
11
Koen Lenaerts, “The Principle of Democracy in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice,”
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 62:2 (2013).
12
Article 2 of the 1992 Treaty of the European Union (TEU) states “[t]he Union is founded on the
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of
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values, or norms, have unofficially been part of the Union since its beginning, but the
collapse of the Soviet Union (1989-1991) likely caused the Union’s shift in focus to
democracy in the 1992 TEU and its amendment with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007. Both of
these treaties aimed to continue the advancement of democracy and rule of law in the EU.13
The fifth enlargement of the EU took place in 2004 when the Union added ten Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE) states, eight of which were former Soviet satellites that operated
under authoritarianism.14 Accession was offered to these newly democratic states primarily to
prevent democratic ‘backsliding’ into their former authoritarian way of governance.15
Despite membership requirements of democracy, economic stability, and human rights
protections, several of these CEE Member States have democratically regressed over the past
two decades. Some of these Member States have adopted undemocratic governance practices
that draw similarities to authoritarianism of their communist pasts.
Given the EU backdrop, the scope of this thesis is not to define democratic
governance or the foundational freedoms listed in Article 2 of the TEU. This thesis intends
analyze global governance, international law and international organization membership
from within the context of certain Member States, in particular Hungary and Romania.
Investigation of the current situations in both Member States is essential, but it is also
necessary to examine the historic influence from the Soviet occupation and communist
dictatorship (1946-1989) in order to fully understand the current state of democracy in
Hungary and Romania. These case studies will offer insight into democratic transitions from
law, principles which are common to the Member States.” These principles are also found in the 5th
Recital of the TEU’s Preamble, as well as the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, which amended the 1992 TEU.
13
http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/index_en.htm.
14
Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and
Slovenia.
15
Attila Ágh, “The Triple Crisis in Hungary: The ‘Backsliding’ of Hungarian Democracy after
Twenty Years,” Romanian Journal of Political Science 13:1 (2013).
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communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the possibility of authoritarian reversals, EU
accession process and its enforcement mechanisms, and democratic norm internalization into
domestic cultures.
Literature Review
To answer the central thesis question, this thesis employs a theoretical approach that
utilizes multiple perspectives to explain the conditions in which an authoritarian Member
State exists in an IO that legally requires democracy from its members. The first theoretical
approach used is stealth authoritarian, and it considers how a Member State constructs an
authoritarian regime despite democratic requirements from the IO it belongs to. The second
theoretical approach comes from the viewpoint of the IO and its enforcement mechanisms to
prevent Member States from building authoritarian regimes. The final theoretical approach
examines the role of the Member State’s domestic society and culture in order to evaluate
what to degree the public has internalized the IO’s democratic norms and laws. These
different vantage points aim to collectivity explain the conditions in which authoritarian
Member States exist in IOs.
Stealth Authoritarianism and Authoritarian Governance
Following the Cold War, democracy clauses have been placed in international
agreements and treaties to establish democracy as a fundamental norm for certain IOs. The
democracy clauses in IO treaties also sanction regimes that abuse their authority through
extra-legal means. Democracy clauses included into treaties can be found in the EU, the
Organization of American States (OAS), the Council of Europe, and the African Union (AU).
16

For instance, Chapter II Article 3 of the OAS Charter states, “The solidarity of the

American States and the high aims which are sought through it require the political
16

David Landau, “Abusive Constitutionalism,” UC Davis Law Review 47 (2013).
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organization of those States on the basis of the effective exercise of representative
democracy.”17 Also, the African Union created the African Charter on Democracy, Elections
and Governance in the early 2000s to provide specific guidelines for democratic governance.
Establishing these norms within IOs has led to the elimination of many transparent
authoritarian regimes.18 The decline of transparent authoritarianism, however, has resulted in
a new authoritarian practices. The growth of civil society around the globe has been a key
contributor for leaders to reconsideration their means of authoritarianism, since civil society
groups aims to expose undemocratic practices and human rights violations. In addition, IO
treaty law that requires democratic governance has caused some Member State leaders with
authoritarian objectives to employ more discrete tactics to achieve their authoritarian goals.
“Stealth authoritarianism serves as a way to protect and entrench power when direct
repression is not a viable option,” which is the case for Member States that adopt
authoritarian governance practices in international organizations that require democracy.19
Some authoritarian leaders have since transformed their governance practices to play
by the same rules as democratic governments.20 Stealth authoritarian regimes use democratic
institutions and practices to create an illusion of legitimacy that masks authoritarianism.
These practices include rewriting constitutions, constitutional amendments, revising court
structures and review powers, appointing judges without oppositional party input, providing
bureaucratic or state institutions with increased powers or duties that formerly belonged to
judicial or legislative branches, and empowering the executive branch to dominate legislative

17

Charter of the Organization of American States.
Varol, Ozan. “Stealth Authoritarianism.” Iowa Law Review 100 (2015).
19
Ibid, 1678.
20
“Stealth Authoritarianism”; Hahn, Gordon M. "Managed democracy? Building stealth
authoritarianism in St. Petersburg." DEMOKRATIZATSIYA-WASHINGTON- 12, no. 2 (2004): 195232.
18
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and judicial branches to rewrite or influence law.21 Stealth authoritarianism makes it
increasingly difficult for outside observers to identify and eradicate governance in
comparison to transparent authoritarian regimes, like those of Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin or
Saddam Hussein.22 Stealth authoritarianism regimes are those that use legal mechanisms in
generally accepted democratic states for anti-democratic ends, such as elections,
constitutional amendment procedures, and judicial review powers.23 These claims have been
made in Russia, Turkey, Hungary, Azerbaijan, Algeria, Ethiopia and Romania.
This thesis tests the components of stealth authoritarianism in its case studies to
evaluate the state of democracy in Hungary and Romania and to determine whether these
governments are authoritarian. Stealth authoritarianism has six interrelated and interactive
components: (1) constitutional order provides the executive branch the power to dominate
and partially control judicial and legislative branches; (2) weak formal institutions and rule of
law; (3) strong informal institutions and networks, which are filled with ruling party loyalists,
that use their power to threaten and persuade opponents; (4) weak civil society; (5) subtle
constitutional violations and maximum usage of loopholes in the constitutional order; (6)
and, control over the mass media.24 Often, international organizations struggle to properly
diagnose stealth authoritarian governance. This is primarily because these organizations
consider these components individually and independently as democratic violations rather
than comprehensively appraising the interaction of these components, which produces
something far worse than the violation of a single IO law. International organizations also

21

“Ibid. (BOTH Stealths above)
“Stealth Authoritarianism.”
23
Ibid.
24
“Stealth Authoritarianism.” Hahn, Gordon M. "Managed democracy? Building stealth
authoritarianism in St. Petersburg." DEMOKRATIZATSIYA-WASHINGTON- 12, no. 2 (2004): 195232.
22
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generally combat these components individually and independently. This approach often
leads to IOs failure to prevent authoritarianism, because the matter is not addressed
systematically.
The toolbox of stealth authoritarian regimes includes using judicial review not as a
check on the political branches of government, but as a tool to consolidate power into the
executive branch and remove accountability for politicians. Stealth authoritarian leaders
often use libel and defamation lawsuits against dissidents, which creates self-censorship in
the media. Legislators in the authoritarian faction adopt electoral laws to disenfranchise
oppositional parties as well as increase the difficulty to remove incumbents. The toolbox also
includes prosecuting political dissidents and opponents with non-political crimes, like tax
evasion or embezzlement, using internationally-supported surveillance laws and institutions
to blackmail or discredit political opponents. In addition, these leaders often enact democratic
reforms and rule of law rhetoric to sculpt public perceptions and deflect attention from
undemocratic practices.25
It is necessary to define the traditional form of authoritarianism to not only
demonstrate the similarities between the two forms but to also highlight the differences. The
forms of authoritarianism utilize different means; however, the undemocratic ends are
incredibly similar. Authoritarianism is traditionally defined as a “legal order in which there is
little or no political pluralism and the incumbent party acts ‘via legal or extralegal means, to
suppress political opposition.’”26 Corruption and abuse of state resources are widespread. It is
incredibly difficult to remove the incumbent party through elections, and regime change is

25
26

Ibid.
Ibid.
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typically only possible by a transition, revolution, coup d’état, or foreign intervention.27
Traditional, or transparent, authoritarian regimes generally have a set of common
mechanisms. These mechanisms include overtly defying or disregarding laws and
constitutions,28 imposing emergency laws or martial law, silencing dissidents with
harassment and violence,29 closure of media outlets and banning publications,30 vote count
manipulation through vote buying, intimidation, and electoral fraud,31 packing courts and
replacing constitutions to remove checks and balances on the authoritarian government’s
power.32 Traditional authoritarian governance is far more blatant and easily detected by
international organizations and the international community when compared to the subtle,
more covert mechanisms utilized in stealth authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, stealth
authoritarian uses variations of these tactics with for the same authoritarian ends.
The law is a crucial tool for stealth authoritarian regimes. These regimes use law to
entrench the status quo, protect their incumbents from democratic challenges, and create a
dominate-party or single-party state.33 The single-party state still has oppositional parties, but
oppositional parties have almost no input in governance. These governments are able to grasp
great amounts of power through legal maneuvering and often enact ‘constitutional coups,’
which “through a series of perfectly legal moves the constitutionally devious leaders can

27

Ibid.
Jan-Erik Lane, Constitutions and Political Theory (1996), 9-10; Miguel González Marcos,
“Comparative Law at the Service of Democracy: A Reading of Arosemena’s Constitutional Studies of
the Latin American Governments,” Boston University International Law Journal 21, 259-278 (2003).
29
Steven Levitsky & Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold
War (2010).
30
Gordon Silverstein, “Singapore: The Exception That Proves the Rule” in Rule by Law: The Politics
of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa eds. (2008).
31
Andreas Schedler, The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral
Authoritarianism (2013).
32
Levitsky & Way, ibid.
33
Varol, supra note 1.
28
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achieve a substantively anti-constitutional result.”34 A constitutional coup is constitutional
because there is no break in legality—the government doesn’t violate any laws to achieve its
goals. It is a coup because the prior constitutional order is turned on its head without a
legitimating process for the changes made.35 In worst-case scenarios, constitutional coups
transform a state from a constitutional democracy to an authoritarian regime while appearing
to respect the constitution through the process.36
One of the clearest indications that a state is becoming authoritarian, regardless of
whether it’s stealth or traditional authoritarianism, is the leadership’s manipulation of the
electoral environment so that electoral outcomes almost always have a predetermined
conclusion.37 Electoral turnover, or partisan alternation, is a core component of democracy
and allows the electoral system to respond to electoral preferences. Electoral turnover proves
that incumbents can be “dethroned.”38 Election and media laws give authoritarian incumbents
advantages that are supplemented by the selective application of the laws against challengers
in the election. This combination provides incumbents with nearly insurmountable
advantages.39
A democratizing state’s reversal to authoritarianism requires the government to work
through and undermine the democratic institutions and practices that were crafted during the
democratic transition. Assessment of stealth authoritarian components can help determine
whether a Member State is systematically creating a stealth authoritarian government or just
34

Scheppele, Kim Lane. "Constitutional Coups and Judicial Review: How Transnational Institutions
can Strengthen Peak Courts at Times of Crisis (With Special Reference to Hungary)." Transnat'l L. &
Contemp. Probs. 23 (2014): 51.
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid.
37
Hahn, Gordon M. "Managed democracy? Building stealth authoritarianism in St.
Petersburg." DEMOKRATIZATSIYA-WASHINGTON- 12, no. 2 (2004): 195-232.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
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violating democracy and rule of law principles in an isolated fashion without an authoritarian
objective; moreover, a government is simply violating a democratic principle but not with the
intention of building an authoritarian government. At times, democratic governments violate
democratic principles, like restricting freedoms and imposing laws through the executive
branch without following legislative protocol after a terrorist attack. Nevertheless, this does
not necessarily mean that this government is attempting to create an authoritarian regime.
Application of stealth authoritarian theory to the following case studies will help
make the distinction of whether a transitioning Member State is in the process an
authoritarian reversal, or whether the Member State suffers from democratic deficiencies but
is ultimately headed toward democratic consolidation. Because EU Member States are
required to have a certain level of democratic progress prior to accession, this theory will
provide insight to the state of democracy and authoritarianism in these Member States. This
is a relatively novel theory and has not been academically critiqued. Employing this theory in
the context of international organizations should provide further insights into stealth
authoritarian theory.
Democratization: International Organizations and the Domestic State
Samuel Huntington argued that democratization in the developing world is “an
important—perhaps the most important—global political development of the late twentieth
century.”40 Democratization has been widely studied. Much of the democratization
scholarship examines the transition from authoritarianism to democracy as one that is
confined to internal national forces. The growing presence of international organizations in
global and national politics has recently led scholars to consider the role of external
40

Huntington, Samuel. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman,
Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, xiii (1991).
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democratization factors, in this case international organizations. Some scholars have claimed
that international actors are essential for a successful regime transformation.41 Existing
democratic countries, like the U.S. and Western European states, have made democracy
promotion a foreign policy goal. International organizations have been a significant tool for
achieving these ends.42 For example, the IO-democracy relationship has helped justify the
growth of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the EU, Council of Europe, and
North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), in which these organizations have
promoted democracy by adding Member States that are transitioning to democracy from
authoritarian regimes.43
Scholarly consideration of the relationship between international and domestic
politics first began with the “second image reversed” theory, which observes how
international factors affect domestic structures.44 This theory surveys various international
factors, including international economic trends, military intervention, and the anarchic
structure of the international system and how IOs affect domestic political structures. The
factors that affect domestic political structures include electoral outcomes, regime type,
domestic coalitions, and trade policies. The second image reversed theory recognizes that
despite the fact that international factors may potentially have a powerful external influence
over domestic regimes, the extent of these international factors influence requires some link

41

Ekiert, Grzegorz et al. “Democracy in the Post-Communist World: An Unending Quest?” Eastern
European Politics and Societies 21:7 (2007).
42
Christopher, Warren. “America’s Leadership, America’s Opportunity.” Foreign Policy 98 (1995).
43
Pevehouse, Jon C. “Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democracy.”
International Organization 56:3 (2002).
44
The “second image reversed” theory was first introduced by Peter Gourevitch. “The Second Image
Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics.” International Organization 32:4 (1978).
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to the domestic political process.45 In response to this original theory, academic scholarship
of how international organizations affect Member States’ domestic democratization has
primarily fallen into two groups: ‘democratization from above’ and the transitionalconsolidation theorists.
First, democratization from above theory contends that IOs can support the
democratization of formerly undemocratic Member States.46 Jon Pevehouse argues that there
are three potential causal mechanisms that explain the effects that IOs can have on regime
change. First, authoritarian regimes can be compelled to liberalize by economic and
diplomatic pressures from IOs when these pressures are paired with internal pressures, such
as protests and social movements. Economic pressures from an IO can create fiscal hardships
on the regime through trade suspensions and seizure of financial benefits. 47 Diplomatic
pressures can result in international isolation that further de-legitimizes the regime
domestically, and during times of crisis a regime’s international standing may be particularly
important. Public and elite perception of the regime can be weakened if allies and
institutional partners treat the state as an outcast. 48 Second, IO membership can lead certain
elite groups to accept liberalization because membership lowers the risks that these groups
face during democratization. There will inherently be groups of elites that will attempt to
stop the liberalization process. IO membership obstructs these groups by making credible
guarantees to key groups that reduce their fears of democratization. Finally, acceptance of

45

Peter Gourevitch. “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics.”
International Organization 32:4 (1978).
46
Pevehouse, Jon C. “Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democracy.”
International Organization 56:3 (2002).
47
Ibid.
48
Whitehead, Laurence. “Democracy by Convergence and Southern Europe: A Comparative Politics
Perspective.” In The International Aspects of Democratization: Europe and the Americas. Ed.
Whitehead, Laurence. Oxford, Oxford University Press (1996).
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liberalization can occur through either a hand-tying process or through the socialization of
domestic elites. The socialization process involved in accession into an IO helps persuade
elites to be less resistant to the liberalization process by changing their belief systems. This is
done when IOs act as an external guarantor of their interests, rights and preferences, or by
adjusting preferences during the socialization process.49
In opposition to democratization from above theory, the transitional-consolidation
camp argues that IOs may be able to promote democracy through the means described above,
but ultimately IOs cannot prevent or stop authoritarian reversals. Transitional-consolidation
theorists argue that ‘democratization from above’ arguments fail to distinguish between the
effects that IOs have on the temporary survival of a transitional democracy and the effects
that ensure long-term democratic consolidation. Milan Svolik argues that scholarship must
distinguish between ‘transitional’ and ‘consolidated’ democracies, because each one has
different challenges to prevent regression to authoritarianism.50 The threat of an authoritarian
reversal is constant in transitional democracies, but authoritarian reversals are rare in
consolidated democracies.51 Therefore, democratic consolidation suggests a qualitative
change has taken place that nearly eliminates the possibility of authoritarian reversion rather
than mere democratic survival.52 However, it is difficult to measure whether or not a state has

49
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International Organization 56:3 (2002).
50
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achieved democratic consolidation.53 A transitional democracy may resist an authoritarian
reversal for a sustained period of time when conditions are favorable, but it still may be at
risk. The factors that enable democratic consolidation and avert authoritarian reversal include
economic performance, wealth, previous military rule, political structures and a combination
of these factors.54
The transitional-consolidation theory suggests that by not addressing this distinction
between transitioning and consolidation that ‘democratization from above’ theorists falsely
suggest that international organizations can promote consolidation as well as prevent
reversals to authoritarianism.55 IOs can foster consolidation in transitional democracies by
building capacity and providing technical expertise, coordinating between public and private
actors, and enhancing transparency.56 The transitional-consolidation argument claims that
IOs cannot stop authoritarian reversals in transitioning democracies, despite their ability
promote democratic consolidation. This is because IOs do not have enforcement mechanisms
strong enough to prevent a reversal.57 There are very few IOs have mechanisms to enforce
their policies with forceful military intervention. The economic sanctions, political pressures
and internal enforcement mechanisms used against noncompliant Member States don’t carry
enough weight to prevent these reversals.
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This thesis uses the second-image reversed perspective to observe the role that IOs
play in national democratization process of their Member States. The ‘democratization from
above’ theory provides insights to promoting democratic consolidation for Member States
and the strategies utilize in the hopes of preventing authoritarian reversals. However, this
thesis contends that the transitional-consolidation theory is appropriate in the case of the EU,
because the EU does not have enforcement mechanisms strong enough to prevent a reversal.
While it is necessary to observe the role that IOs have on Member State democratization,
analysis of internalization and compliance of international law is the next step to
comprehensively study why a transitioning Member States reverts to an authoritarian regime
and violates IO law.
Internalization and Compliance with International Law
Internalization of international law is defined as “the process by which nations
incorporate international law concepts into domestic practice.”58 Ratification of international
treaties or acceptance of a customary international law principle technically binds a state to
follow the rule, but there is widespread agreement that international law is not fully
implemented until it has been internalized domestically.59 Transitioning Member States that
have not internalized an IO’s treaty law requirements for democratic governance into their
domestic institutions, or a if Member State’s domestic society has not deemed democracy
and rule of law as the appropriate behavior for governance, are far less likely to reach
democratic consolidation. Therefore, these Member States are more vulnerable for
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authoritarian reversals. The “logic of appropriateness” declares that actors, both elites
working in government and individual citizens, are required to have a binding sense of
obligation to law before it becomes accepted as the appropriate standard of behavior.60 The
logic of appropriateness leads to the creation of international norms, which is defined as “a
standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.” 61 International relations
scholarship defines international norms as, “shared understandings of standards of
behavior,”62 which “guide human behavior,”63 that “indicate how a state should behave.”64
The most widely accepted theory of norm development and emergence in international legal
studies scholarship is the emergence through a norm entrepreneur.65
When a new concept becomes an international norm, it typically starts with a norm
entrepreneur, which is a person, group of people, institution or a state that has strong notions
about the appropriate or desirable behavior in their community.66 After the norm emerges and
is advocated by the entrepreneur, decision-makers increasingly recognize the norm until it
reaches a tipping point where the norm attains recognition. Next, there is a torrent of
recognition and acceptance of the norm by the general population. Ultimately, the norm
becomes widely accepted and ingrained into a society to the point where it becomes the
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standard of appropriate behavior.67 However, the sociological perspective of international
norms provides a more encompassing definition in which international norms are established
through institutions; that is, international norms are “a relatively stable collection of practices
and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations.”68
Regardless, international law and international norms are so tightly linked that the two terms
can be used interchangeably.69 Since the sociological prospective advances the international
relations definition, this thesis combines these two terms for its definition of international
norms.
Understanding how states internalize international law is essential to understanding
the role of international law within a specific state. In order to fill the void for weak or
nonexistent enforcement capabilities, international law needs to be internalized into the fabric
of domestic law to make the international legal rules punishable by domestic legal
mechanisms.70 Domestic populations cannot perceive international laws as appropriate, and
therefore binding, until the international laws have been embedded and accepted into the
domestic legal culture and institutions, which comprise a state’s legal tradition. 71 Cultural
attributes of legal tradition include purpose of law, origins of law, and concern about
reputation as a law abider. Institutional attributes include separation of powers and strength
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of the judiciary, hierarchy of law, and monist versus dualist position.72 A state’s legal
tradition can provide great insight to compliance with international law and internalization of
IO norms.
A democratizing state’s legal tradition has often changed dramatically as the state
transitions between regime-types. Democratizing states typically have to completely rebuild
their legal institutions and governance structures in the process, which includes transforming
their institutional attributes mentioned above. The cultural attributes need to follow these
institutional modifications in order for democratic and rule of law principles to be
comprehensively internalized. Crises can impede internalization of democratic norms
institutionally and culturally. Commonly, economic crises obstruct internalization of
democratic norms, but even accession into an IO can create a crisis capable of blocking
internalization.
This thesis uses internalization, norm adoption and legal tradition theory in its case
studies to explain why a Member State violates EU laws, norms, and potentially implements
authoritarian practices. Hungary and Romania had to completely reconfigure their legal
tradition not only during the democratization process but to also align with EU norms. In
addition, this theoretical approach considers the effects the 2008 global economic crisis had
on the internalization process. Both of these countries had only just become Member States
prior to the global economic crisis in 2008. Their legal traditions had not fully adopted
democracy and EU norms. The economic crisis partially influenced each country’s domestic
society to lose of faith in democracy and the EU as effective governance structures.
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Therefore, domestic societies did not require their leaders to fully comply with democratic
principles.
Methodology
This thesis takes a comparative legal studies approach. The principal research
methodology employed below is content analysis of primary and secondary sources. The
primary sources used in this research are European Union treaties, the Hungarian
Fundamental Law and legislation, the Romanian Fundamental Law and legislation,
Constitutional Court decisions in both countries, civil society reports, studies and research
projects conducted at Central European University’s Center for Media, Data and Society, and
reports by European institutions.
The primary research relied greatly on the Council of Europe’s European
Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission). Even though the Venice
Commission is not an EU institution, this Commission provides comprehensive legal
opinions examining laws and institutional structures for potential violations of democratic
principles and European norms. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) and the studies conducted by its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights provided data and analysis for electoral fairness and national relevant electoral laws.
Reports prepared by Amnesty International provided information regarding civil society and
NGOs. Secondary sources include scholarly journal articles and books that examine
democratic and economic transitions of Central and Eastern European countries, national
politics in the region, democracy building, authoritarianism and international organizations,
especially the European Union.
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Curiosity into governance in Hungary initially began after a proposed Internet tax
failed to be enacted after thousands of protesters gathered in its opposition in Budapest. I
intended to research the Fidesz government’s policies for Internet governance but quickly
realized that Hungary had a much larger, systemic issue with its government. I spent the
summer of 2015 in Budapest at Central European University’s Center for Media, Data and
Society as an intern and a research fellow. General assessment and assumptions about the
state of Hungary and the region’s national governments have been formulated through my
work with Central-Eastern European scholars, lawyers at the Hungarian Civil Liberties
Union, and observations through personal experiences during my time spent in Hungary. I
also led discussion groups at CEU’s summer course in Advanced Topics of Internet
Governance, Civil Society and Policy Advocacy with regional freedom of expression and
media experts to learn about global attitudes towards Hungary’s governance and media
policies.
This thesis then researched Romania to provide context for the Hungarian
government. Romania and Hungary have several commonalities. They both were Sovietoccupied states following World War II, and began their democratic transitions in 1989.
They both have also recently joined the EU and have struggled to ensure democracy and rule
of law in this decade. Aside from these broad commonalities, Prime Minister Ponta’s actions
in 2012 appeared to be strikingly similar to those of the Fidesz government. However, the
EU had far greater influence over governance in Romania compared to Hungary. Therefore,
Romania became a viable example to provide additional and nuanced findings for the central
research question.
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Member State Authoritarian Reversals
International organizations that value democracy as a key tenet of the organization
typically require that Member States meet minimum standards of democracy before
accession. IO membership is often one of the reasons that prompt a former authoritarian state
to democratize. A democratizing state’s reversal to authoritarian requires the government and
its actors in the reversal to work through and undermine the democratic institutions and
practices that were crafted during the democratic transition. In order to assess whether a
Member State is systematically and overtly creating an authoritarian government or just
violating democracy and rule of law principles without an authoritarian objective, this section
uses stealth authoritarian theory to make this determination through case studies. To measure
stealth authoritarianism, case studies analyze its six components. Democratizing Member
States are more likely to move toward authoritarianism when the following forces are
present: (1) the executive branch uses constitutional order to dominate and partially control
judicial and legislative branches; (2) the regime rewrites law or uses constitutional loopholes
to consolidate power into the executive branch; (3) the regime builds strong formal as well as
informal institutions that are filled with ruling-party loyalists; (4) the regime has strong
control over mass media; (5) ruling-party turnover is obstructed by election and campaign
laws that provide incumbents with unfair electoral advantages over challengers; and, (6),
there is a weak civil society. These sub-hypothesis, however, are not independent. Rather,
they are interactive and certain components cannot be achieved if others are not present.
This section employs these six stealth authoritarian hypotheses on both the current
situations in Hungary and Romania to determine whether they have engaged stealth
authoritarian governance and experienced an authoritarian reversal. The second section will
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analyze the EU’s enforcement mechanisms and response to undemocratic practices in these
case studies. Finally, the internalization of international law section will explore why these
case studies have not complied with the EU’s democratic norms and laws in certain scenarios
and the effect that crises have had on the democratization and the norm internalization
process.
Case Study: The Fidesz Government in Hungary
In Hungary’s 2010 election, the Fidesz party and its coalition with the Christian
Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) won more than two-thirds of seats in Parliament, after
they won nearly 53 percent of the popular vote.73 Despite the authoritarian practices of the
Fidesz government after winning its supermajority, this was a free and fair election. Due to
disproportionate electoral laws, 53 percent of the popular vote translated into 68 percent of
Parliamentary seats. 74 In a proportionate electoral system the percentage of votes won for a
particular party equals the percentage of seats won in Parliament. However, Hungary’s
disproportionate electoral system is weighted and provides extra seats, which is how 53
percent of the popular vote translated into 68 percent of the seats in Parliament. The
disproportionate election system was created as Hungary was transitioning into democracy in
1989. Leaders in the transition created this disproportionate electoral system in order to
promote pluralism in Parliament, prevent the communists from regaining control, and to
provide smaller parties with more seats. In 2010, this system backfired for proponents of
democracy. The Fidesz party has been able to grab a tremendous amount of power and pass
legislation without debate or votes from other parties in Parliament.
73

KNDP is officially a coalition partner with Fidesz, however, the party has been unable to get into
Parliament on its own and break the election threshold of 5 percent since it barely did so in 1994.
KDNP has nearly no influence over the Fidesz agenda, and the coalition was primarily created so the
Fidez government could win enough votes to win a supermajority.
74

Hungary’s Parliament is also known as the National Assembly.

29
The Fidesz party was able to quickly grab power partially because of Hungary’s weak
separations between its branches of government. As portrayed in Figure 1 below, Hungary
has a unicameral Parliament. There are limited checks built in the Hungary’s government
structure. There is no real separation between legislative branch and the Prime Minister,
because the majority party in Parliament selects the Prime Minister. Also, the majority party
selects the President. There are incredibly weak separations between legislative and
executive branches. Therefore, a strong and independent Constitutional Court in Hungary is
an essential check against other political branches. The Constitutional Court is the only
formal check against the legislative and executive branch. The leaders of the democratic
transition understood this and knew the importance adding checks to its democratizing
government.
Figure 1: The Structure of Hungary’s Governmental Branches
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Hungary held its first free and fair elections for the first time in over four decades in
1990. As Hungary was transitioning into democracy in 1989, the leaders of the transition
heavily amended the 1949 Stalinist-era constitution (Act XX of 1949) at roundtable
meetings. 75 The amendments to Act XX of 1949 created a constitution that met the standards
of a modern, democratic constitution that protected human rights and fundamental
freedoms.76 The roundtable meetings, which were comprised of oppositional parties and the
communists who had just lost their 40-year grip in the country, were concerned with two
hazards to Hungary’s transition to a multiparty democracy: a fractured parliament where
small parties were unable to form stable coalitions, which was addressed by the
disproportionate electoral system, and a deeply entrenched constitution that would be too
difficult to change once the new democratic leaders gauged how they wanted to design their
political institutions.77 The amendments, also known as the 1989 Constitution due to such
vast changes to the previous Constitution, established an amendment process that required a
two-thirds majority vote to amend the Constitution. This created an amendment threshold
that was attainable and not excessively demanding that the Constitution could not be
amended as democratic leaders began to recognize what Hungary needed to democratize. 78
The leaders of the transitions also made structural adjustments to bolster democratic
governance.
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The 1989 Constitution established a judicial check against the other branches when it
created the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court was constructed to be independent
and have wide powers of judicial review to check the powers of the executive and legislative
branches. The 1989 Constitution established actio popularis to bring matters before the
Constitutional Court. Actio popularis allows anyone to bring a case before the Court, not just
those affected by the law, to review laws for constitutionality. As a result, nearly every
important law was challenged before for the Court. Indeed, the Constitutional Court became
the highest respected political institution in Hungary in the early stages of the transition.79
In addition to the Constitutional Court, the 1989 Constitution made additional checks
against Hungary’s unicameral parliamentary system. It established the public consultation
process, which changed Parliamentary procedure to require extensive consultation with civil
society and opposition parties before bills can be put to a vote. Four ombudsmen were also
added to monitor Parliament and ensure that human rights were protected. Further, the
amendments created politically independent bureaucratic institutions: the central bank, state
audit office, prosecutor general’s office, national election commission and the media board.
Up until the Fidesz government’s victory in 2010, Hungary’s transition to democracy had
been relatively successful in comparison to other democratizing states in Eastern Europe.
Scholarship prior to 2010 generally applauded Hungary’s democratic advancements and
found the country to be a beacon of democratic hope for the former Soviet-controlled states.
Despite these democratic advancements, nearly all of these checks have been
eliminated once the Fidesz Party took power in 2010. Table 1 summarizes the components of
stealth authoritarian in Hungary and the current state of these components. Hungary’s
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Parliament has become a political tool of Prime Minister Orbán’s office. There is essentially
no separation between Parliament and the executive branch because of the majority party’s
power to choose the Prime Minister and the primarily ceremonial President of Hungary. Due
to limited institutional separation and coordination between the Prime Minister’s Office,
Parliament and the Presidency, reference of these institutions will be consolidated into ‘the
government’ throughout this thesis. The government’s leader is Prime Minister Victor Orbán.
This case study investigates each of the components of stealth authoritarian on the Fidesz
government since it gained power in 2010.
Table 1: Stealth Authoritarian Indicators in Hungary
Legal Tool to Consolidate Power
Strength of the Judiciary
Strength of Formal Institutions Checks on
Government
Informal Institutions
Control over Mass Media
Strength of Civil Society

Supermajority in Parliament
Weak
Weak
Packed with Fidesz Loyalists
Strong
Weak-Moderate
Frequent Attacks by the Government

Use of Law and Constitutional Loopholes for Executive Branch Consolidation
The first sign that the Fidesz government was moving towards stealth authoritarian
occurred into just its third month in power. The Fidesz government used its supermajority to
amend the four-fifths rule for drafting a new constitution. In 1995, the Socialist (MszP)
majority government amended the 1989 Constitution procedural rule for drafting a new
Constitution from a two-thirds majority vote in Parliament to require a four-fifths vote. The
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amendment required oppositional party input and cooperation in the drafting process. The
new rule essentially required a “super” supermajority for writing a new constitution.80
After the Fidesz government easily amended the four-fifths rule with its
supermajority, it began to write a new Constitution. The drafting process took place from
October 2010 to April 2011 and consisted of two disconnected stages: an inconsequential
public stage (stage 1) and a consequential secret stage (stage 2).81 In October 2011, a
constitutional commission, called the Salamon Commission after its chair László Salamon
and comprised of members of Parliament (MPs), was given the task of to create a list of
principles for the new Constitution.82 The meetings were open and civil society groups were
able to provide their opinions. The list of principles, however, did not reflect any of the
opinions or proposals made by civil society or the ‘democratic opposition’ parties in
Parliament—the Socialist MszP party and the new Green LMP party.83 The democratic
opposition parties left the Salamon Commission when none of their proposals were accepted.
Nevertheless, the Fidesz bloc approved the Commission’s constitutional principles on March
7, 2011, with a Parliamentary resolution.84
In stage 2, which also began on March 7, 2011, the approved resolution stated that
members of Parliament (MPs) had one week to propose a complete draft of the new
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constitution due to the national holiday commemorating the 1848 Revolution that takes place
on March 15th each year. The resolution also stated that the proposed Constitution could be
written with or without taking the draft principles into account. The first stage of the drafting
process was disconnected from the second, and the drafts were written in secrecy. It is
rumored that the Constitution’s lead author, József Szájer, wrote much of it on his iPad.85
Szájer at the time was not even a member of Hungarian Parliament. Nevertheless, Szájer is a
member of the party’s inner circle and a Fidesz member to the European Parliament. There is
no official record of who was involved in the drafting process, consultation, opinions
engaged, or how the final draft was created, despite many Fidesz MPs claiming credit for
being part of the process.
The draft of the Constitution came out on March 14, 2011, and was introduced into
Parliament as a private member’s bill by Péter Ágh from the Fidesz party and András
Andradszki from the Christian Democratic party. A private member’s bill in Hungarian
Parliament bypasses steps normally required by government bills. Government bills typically
require impact assessment as well as consultation from relevant agencies that must enforce
the law and civil society groups that would be affected by the law. Because the impact
assessment and consultation were not required, they were of course not performed by
Parliament. Regardless, the Fidesz bloc insists that the public was involved in the
consultation process since they sent out questionnaires to registered voters in late February
and early March 2011. However, the questionnaire did not address any substantive questions
about constitutional design and were sent out right before the constitutional draft appeared,
which meant that the questionnaires could not be collected and assessed in time to affect the
85
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draft. On April 18, 2011, the Fidesz bloc in Parliament passed the new Constitution (the
Fundamental Law) without a single vote from opposition parties. The Socialist MszP and
new Green LMP parties abstained from voting as a form of protest, but votes from these
parties would have been inconsequential due to the Fidesz supermajority. During the drafting
process and prior to adoption, thousands of protesters demonstrated in Budapest to voice
their disapproval and hope to persuade the government not to adopt the new Constitution.
Protesters were concerned with the government overextending its power, limitations on
freedoms, and forcing Christian ideology onto citizens. Nevertheless, the voices of those who
opposed the Fundamental Law were not powerless to prevent its adoption.
The Fidesz government has successfully achieved a key element of stealth
authoritarianism. The government first used its supermajority to amend the rules for drafting
a new Constitution. Several procedural rules were bypassed, like public consultation and
impact assessment. Next, the Fidesz government was able to write the Fundamental Law
without any input in drafting the document from oppositional parties, without a legitimate
debate Parliament, and without a single vote from opposing parties. Now that the Fidesz
government has created its constitutional order, the government begins to dismantle formal
checks against its centralized power.
Dismantling the Judiciary and Formal Checks Against the Executive Branch
The leaders of the 1989 democratic transition recognized that the unicameral
parliamentary system in Hungary relies on a formal judiciary institution to check the power
of the closely-knit legislative and executive branches. As the Fidesz government established
its authority in Parliament, the Prime Minister’s office and the Presidential office, it began to
dismantle the Constitutional Court in order to further consolidate power. Elimination of the
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Constitutional Court’s strength and independence would essentially eliminate all the formal
checks against the Fidesz government. It is necessary to examine a series of legal battles
between the Constitutional Court and the Fidesz government—along with uncontested
legislation—to realize certain interactive components of stealth authoritarianism:
consolidation of power for executive branch through constitutional order, weak formal
institutions and rule of law, and subtle constitutional violations and maximum usage of
constitutional loopholes.
The initial step to weaken the strength and independence of the Constitutional Courts
was packing the Court with judges selected by the Fidesz government. First, the procedure
for electing Constitutional Court judges was amended so that a single two-thirds
Parliamentary vote can place a judge in the Court. Prior to the amendment, multiparty
agreement was necessary for nominating a judge to the Court.86 Next, the Fidesz government
increased the number of judges on the Court from 11 to 15, which allowed the government to
pack the Court with judges of its choice. The Parliament also gave itself the authority to elect
the Constitution Court’s president. This was previously the task of the Court’s judges to elect
its president. These three acts occurred in the Fidesz government’s first year in power. Each
placement of the new judges into the Court was done so without any opposition party
influence. The Fidesz government selected nine out the fifteen judges in its first three years.
Currently, only three sitting judges were appointed to the Court prior to 2010. As expected,
the new judges in the Court have voted in unison with the Fidesz government’s position in
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each case heard by the Court, with only a few exceptions.87 Only Justice István Stumpf has
gone against party lines more than once even though he is a member of the Fidesz party. He
has been ridiculed as a disloyal and traitorous party member.88
As the Court was in the process of being packed with Fidesz loyalists, it fought back
against the government on a number of occasions. The first battle between the Fidesz
government and the Constitutional Court was over a 98 percent retroactive tax against the
severance payments paid to all state officials who left their posts after Jan. 1, 2010. It is
likely that this tax was aimed at the officials from the previous government who were leaving
office to make room for the new Fidesz appointees. The Court found this law to be
unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the Constitution’s prohibition of ex post facto
laws and the size of the tax was confiscatory.89 In retaliation, the government passed two
constitutional amendments. The first amendment restricted the jurisdiction of the Court so it
could generally no longer review any law that impacts fiscal or tax policy.90 The second
reenacted the retroactive tax, extending the tax back five years. After the new retroactive
severance tax went into effect, it was challenged before the Court again. The Court heard the
case, despite the constitutional amendment that restricted its jurisdiction, and struck down the
tax again.91 The Court bypassed its constitutional jurisdiction by claiming the tax violated
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human dignity rather than being a fiscal matter. However, the Fidesz government found a
significant loophole in the Court’s decision.92 As the Court limited its judgment to 20052010, which was prior the constitutional amendment restricting its jurisdiction, the Court
acknowledged that the Parliament could restrict its jurisdiction going forward after passing
the 2010 amendment.93 Therefore, the taxes levied on severance payments after the
jurisdiction-limiting amendment that went into effect were constitutional.
Next, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of the amendment restricting its powers
on fiscal and tax laws. Unfortunately, the Court found that it did not have the powers to
evaluate constitutional amendments for substantive unconstitutionality because the
amendment was passed in a formally constitutional manner. Nevertheless, the Court
chastised the Fidesz government for frequently amending the Constitution in its first year of
office; these actions were prior to the enactment of the Fundamental Law.94 The three
dissenting justices—András Bragyova, László Kiss, and Miklós Lévay—were all elected
prior to 2010. Former Chief Counsel to the President of the Hungarian Constitutional Court
Gabor Halmai remarked, “the Court created a very bad precedent, the Majority of
Constitutional Judges voluntarily signing the death sentence to judicial review.”95
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The next blow dealt to the Court’s judicial review powers was found in Fundamental
Law, which became effective on Jan. 1, 2012. The Fundamental Law ended actio popularis
and implemented a German-style constitutional complaint system. The German-style
constitutional complaint process only allows those who are affected by an unconstitutional
law to bring a complaint before the Court. It is rare that laws that involve institutional power
and the structure of government institutions directly affect individuals in a manner that is not
abstract. These abstract constitutional challenges can still be brought before the Court by
ombudsmen, the President or 25 percent the members in Parliament. However, the current
oppositional party division between the far left (the Socialists [MszP]) and the far right
(Jobbik) make it unlikely that 25 percent of MPs will be able to organize a challenge. In
addition, the Fidesz government eliminated of three of the four ombudsmen postions.
Further, the President who is elected by MPs is not likely to challenge the current
government on constitutional issues.
The first case to be brought before the Court under the new complaint system
ironically involved the lowering of the retirement age for ordinary courts judges from 70 to
62 on the day the Fundamental Law went into effect (Jan. 1, 2012). In one fell swoop, 10
percent of the ordinary judiciary were forced to retire, including eight of the 20 court
presidents at the county level and 20 of the 80 Kuria judges (Supreme Court). 96 Prior to the
judicial retirement law, the Fidesz government suspended the usual procedure for electing
judges from June 2011 to January 2012 until the Fundamental Law went into effect. The
power to fill the empty seats was given to the newly elected President of the National Judicial
Office Tünde Handó, who is wife of Jószef Szájer who infamously wrote much of the
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Fundamental Law on his iPad. Several prematurely retired judges brought their cases before
the Constitutional Court. On July 16, 2012, the Court ruled that lowering the retirement age
was an arbitrary change in their status and violated the independence of the judges.97
Dissenting opinions all came from justices elected by the Fidesz parliamentary
supermajority: Justices Balsai, Dienes-Oehm, Svívós, Lenkovics and Szalay, Pokol and
Stumpf. After the Court shot down this law, Prime Minister Orbán angrily said in a press
conference, “the system is to stay,” despite the Court’s ruling that the law was
unconstitutional.98 In response, the European Commission of the EU began to apply political
pressure on the government and began an infringement procedure. The Fidesz government
replied and changed the law so the retirement age became 65 and the retirement process
would be over ten years, instead of retiring at 62 over a one-year process. Increasing the
retirement process to ten years allowed many judges to work past the age of 65.
The next battle between the Fidesz government and Constitutional Court came after
the Court ruled that parts of the Transitional Provisions to the Fundamental Law were
unconstitutional. The Fundamental Law referred to a list of laws called the Transitional
Provisions that specified how to implement the new constitution, but its legal status was
ambiguous from the start. The Transitional Provisions were passed in Parliament on Dec. 30,
2011, and went into effect the same day the Fundamental Law went into effect on Jan. 1,
2012. Parliament claimed the Transitional Provisions were amendments to the Fundamental
Law. Parliament was trying to make amendments to the Fundamental Law before it even
came into effect. The ombudsman who brought the challenge before the Court said
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Parliament had not passed the Transitional Provisions as a constitutional amendment and
could not be part of the constitution.99
The Court examined not only the formal Parliamentary procedure for amending the
Fundamental Law but also reviewed the subject matter of what a constitutional amendment
should be. All of the judges elected before the Fidesz government took power voted to strike
the Provisions. At this time, seven of the 15 judges in the Court were appointed and elected
by Fidesz, and they did not yet have a decisive majority. This is one of the occasions that
Justice Stumpf voted against the government. The Court found that constitutional
amendments must take proper form through direct incorporation into the constitution rather
than laws and rules tacked onto the end of the constitution. Moreover, the Transitional
Provisions could not be part of the Fundamental Law because the transitional nature of these
laws only allows them to function during the transition period between constitutions. In
addition to striking down the permanence of the Transitional Provisions, the Court also found
that the Provisions could not regulate other topics and act as an “open gateway” to push
through all kinds of permanent changes to the Fundamental Law without amending the
constitutional text. 100
The Court struck down all parts of provisions that were not transitional. This included
the introduction of the Transition Provisions and its first four articles. The introduction
condemned the pre-1989 communist regime run by the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party
(communist party) as a criminal organization and claimed the largest opposition to Fidesz in
Parliament, the Socialist party (MszP), is the communist party’s successor. The Provisions
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also removed statutes of limitations for ‘crimes’ committed during the communist era, and
opened up the door to prosecute MszP members for these ‘crimes.’ Article 11(3)(4) allowed
the head of the National Judicial Office to move cases from court to court at her discretion,
and this power was also given to the Prosecutor General. There is a long list of laws thrown
into the “open gateway” that were removed by the Court.101
The battle over the Transitional Provisions did not end here. The Fidesz government
reenacted all the components of the Transitional Provisions with the Fourth Amendment to
the Fundamental Law. The Fourth Amendment struck a major blow to the Constitutional
Court by nullifying all the decisions the Court made opposing the Fidesz government since
the Fundamental Law became effective.102 The Court previously found that the Fundamental
Law’s definition of the family was unduly narrow as it did not include same-sex partnerships
and other non-canonical family formations,103 but the Fourth Amendment reinstated the
requirement that “family ties shall be based on marriage and the relationship between parents
and children.”104 The Court voided the law that that criminalized homelessness, but the
Fourth Amendment reinstated this.105 The Court found the law that banned displaying
extremist symbols, specifically the swastika and the Soviet red star, unconstitutional. The
Fourth Amendment not only made speech against minorities illegal but also went a step
further to ban hate speech against the Hungarian Nation.106 The Court ruled against the law
that removed the legal status of more than 300 churches, which also gave Parliament the sole
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power to determine official churches. The Amendment, however, gave this power back to
Parliament as well as the additional power to recognize churches based on their willingness
to participate in the state’s community goals.107 The last notable law reinstated by the
Amendment is the campaign advertising law that bans parties from advertising in commercial
broadcasts that the Court previously found unconstitutional.108 Not only did the Fourth
Amendment reinstate these laws, but also, more importantly, it hamstrung the Court from
continuing to challenge the government. Essentially, the Fourth Amendment was the final
blow in the battle to eliminate the Court’s check against Parliament and the closely linked
executive branch. The Amendment prohibited the Court from expanding beyond the scope of
questions submitted for constitutional review; the Court’s review must be “closely related” to
the question submitted.109 It also explicitly restricted the Court from substantively reviewing
constitutional amendments for conflicts within the constitution, like the Court had done so
with the Transitional Provisions. The Court can now only review amendment procedures.110
The Fourth Amendment nullified all the decisions made by the Court in its 22-year history
when the Fundamental Law went into effect.111 Prime Minister Obán and Fidesz government
eliminated the primary check against it power. After the only substantial check against the
Fidesz government’s consolidation of power by Constitutional Court was removed, the other
weaker, informal checks were easily dismantled.
The other formal institution that can act as a check against Parliament and the Prime
Minister is the President of Hungary. Under the previous constitution, the president had veto
powers to suspend a law and either send it back to Parliament for revision or send it to the
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Constitutional Court for review. In 2010, instead of changing the laws regarding the
president’s powers, the Fidesz government changed the person. Through parliamentary
procedure, which went uncontested once again due to its supermajority, Fidesz elected the
party’s former vice-chair Pál Schmitt as president. President Schmitt did not attempt to block
any of the Parliament’s actions during his presidency.112 He stepped down in April 2012 due
to a plagiarism scandal regarding his 1992 doctoral thesis, but he was replaced with Fidesz
co-founder János Áder.
In July 2015, the Fidesz government passed an amendment to the Freedom of
Information Act that decimated the former freedom of information guarantees in order for
Fidesz to further conceal its actions, protect itself against corruption charges and protect the
institutions that the government had established. Freedom of information “guarantees the
transparency of the activities of public authorities and of the spending of public
funds.”113 The amended Freedom of Information Act, which was signed by President Ader,
allows public bodies to charge for “human labor costs.” Yet, it is unclear how much the
public has to pay for “human labor costs.” Previously, the only charges for data requests
came from the cost of copying documents. One provision of the bill allows public bodies to
refuse data requests for ten years if the data was used in decision-making processes. This
impedes any potential investigation into government spending by the public or civil society
groups. The Fidesz government comprehensively blocked any checks against it from political
institutions and the public. The next step Prime Minister Orbán and the Fidesz government
take to ensure that they are not obstructed at any turn and entrench their power is packing
informal institutions with loyalists.
112

Bánkuti, Miklós et al. “Disabling the Constitution.” Journal of Democracy 23:3 (2012).
Definition provided by the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union Freedom of Information and Data
Protection Program Director Fanny Hidvégi. See http://tasz.hu/en/freedom-of-information.
113

45
The European Union has done little to prevent Constitutional Court’s diminishing
strength, independence, and power against the government’s consolidation. The EU only
became involved when the retirement age of judges was lowered. But, the EU requested the
Fidesz government to redress this matter on grounds of discrimination rather than violation
of the Union’s principles of democracy. Further, the Fidesz government only partially
complied with the European Union Court of Justice’s decision. The government
compromised and extended the retirement age to 65. Moreover, the EU could have
obstructed an essential component to authoritarianism by intervening when the Constitutional
Court lost is independence and its formal check against the Fidesz government’s growing
strength.
Strong Public Institutions and Entrenching Future Power
As the Fidesz government was weakening formal institutions and their checks against
its supermajority in Parliament, the government was also filling state and bureaucratic
institutions with Fidesz loyalists and expanding the powers of these institutions. These
institutions include the National Judicial Office, Budget Council, State Audit Office, Public
Prosecutor, Media Authority and Council, and Election Commission. The Fidesz government
has also created terms for these positions that can last several election cycles as well as
remain in office for the unforeseeable future in many circumstances. The following section
will address each of these institutions and how the Fidesz government has used them for
authoritarian ends.
The Constitutional Court was not the only part of the judiciary that lost its
independence. Under the former Constitution, a panel of judges selected the lower-court
judges. The Fundamental Law replaced this process when it established the National Judicial
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Office (NJO). Parliament elected Tünde Handó, the wife of József Szájer, the infamous
Fundamental Law drafter, as the president of the NJO. The NJO president is elected to a
nine-year term; however, she can only be replaced after her term expires once Parliament has
selected a candidate with a two-thirds vote. Therefore, Handó may be able to legally remain
in office past her nine-year term if Parliament cannot muster a two-thirds majority to replace
her. Even if the Fidesz party loses its majority in Parliament, the new majority would need to
garner support for two-thirds vote to remove her. Fidesz government has implemented this
same replacement rule for the head of all the informal institutions mentioned above.
Indeed, this move to insert a Fidesz-friendly figure in the role of NJO president is
highly consequential for the purposes of institutional control. The head of the NJO has the
power to select new judges, promote and demote judges, begin disciplinary proceedings, and
select court leaders. The NJO president chooses new judges from a list prepared by local
judicial councils, but she creates the application process and can reject lists created by the
councils and restart the process. The President of Hungary signs off on all judicial
appointments, but the Fidesz appointed President is unlikely to reject appointment made by
another Fidesz loyalist. The Fourth Amendment also gave the NJO president the authority to
reassign cases to any court in Hungary. The best examples of this office working to the
benefit of the Fidesz government occurred in February 2012. Handó reassigned a case
involving a high-profile corruption case against MszP officials and another case that was an
appeal to criminal corruption conviction against a Fidesz party member from a Budapest
court to the countryside. Both decisions were favorable for the Fidesz government. Handó
effectively has the power to decide which judge hears any case.
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The Fundamental Law created the Budget Council, which is comprised of three
members. Two members are elected by a two-thirds vote in Parliament for six-year terms and
the third member is appointed to a 12-year term by the President of Hungary. Fidesz loyalists
were of course selected for these positions. The Budget Council can veto any budget
proposed by Parliament if it adds even one forint (Hungarian currency) to the national debt.
The Fundament Law provided the President with the power to dissolve Parliament and call
for new elections if a budget is not agreed upon by March 31 of each year. Moreover, if
Fidesz is in jeopardy of losing its power in Parliament to another party, this provision could
thwart the oppositional party’s chance to take control of Parliament.
Under the new order of the Fundamental Law, the State Audit Office, which was
formerly an incredibly strong and independent institution, has been given the power to
investigate the alleged misuse of public funds. However, the former Fidesz MP who was
elected to the 12-year term as head of the Office has no professional audit training.114 Similar
loyalist-packing took place in other key state bureaucratic institutions as well. The head of
the Public Prosecutor’s Office, Péter Polt, was nominated in 2010 by President Schmitt and
elected by a two-thirds vote in Parliament. Polt became a Fidesz member in 1993 and ran for
a Parliamentary mandate in 1994, which he lost. The number of ombudsmen has been
reduced from four to one. Formerly in Hungary, ombudsmen had their own office, staff and
jurisdiction to monitor certain human rights areas. The new regime only has one ombudsman
who has two deputies and the staff has been greatly reduced. Specifically, the data-protection
ombudsman’s office was removed, and this authority was consolidated into the government
and its independence has been abolished.
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The National Election Commission (NEC) is comprised of seven members that are
appointed by the President and elected with a two-thirds vote from Parliament. As with the
NJO and the Budget Council, among others discussed above, each NEC commissioner is a
Fidesz loyalist. NEC commissioners are elected to nine-year term but remain in office if
Parliament cannot garner a two-thirds vote to replace the commissioners once their term has
expired. The NEC is responsible for overseeing that election laws are followed, deciding on
complaints, and administering final results. Fidesz control over the NEC provided Fidesz
incumbents with tremendous advantages over challengers during the 2014 election. The
commission’s seemingly unlimited term will provide Fidesz incumbents with advantages
over challengers in the future.
Hungary’s media regulatory body includes the Media Authority and the Media
Council. The Media Authority is hierarchically superior to the Media Council, and it consists
of three elements: the President of the Authority, the Media Council, and the Office of the
Media Council. The President of the Authority is appointed by the President of Hungary after
being nominated by the Prime Minister and serves a nine-year term. The Fidesz government
selected former Fidesz MP Annamária Szalai as the Media Authority’s President. The Media
Law created the system so the President of the Media Authority is also the Chairperson of the
Media Council. The President-Chairperson has the sole power to appoint positions in these
bodies, and Szalai appointed Fidesz loyalists to key positions. Per usual, the PresidentChairperson can remain in office after the term expires until Parliament musters a two-thirds
majority to elect a replacement.
In addition to packing state institutions and expanding their roles, cardinal laws have
entrenched the Fidesz agenda into future governance, whether or not the Fidesz party has a
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majority in Parliament. Cardinal laws in Hungary are those passed by Parliament that require
a relative two-thirds vote to pass as well amend. 115 In order to enact or amend the cardinal,
there must be an absolute majority. Therefore, cardinal laws have become entrenched in legal
code almost as much as the Fundamental Law due to the high standard to overturn these
laws. The Fidesz government with its supermajority has been able to pass cardinal laws at
will since 2010. These laws will remain in the legal code until a new party earns a
supermajority in Parliament or is able to build a two-thirds coalition.
Packing informal institutions with loyalists is a vital component for constructing a
stealth authoritarian government. These public institutions typically regulate government
activity and can provoke legal actions for violations. These institutions also ensure that the
political playing field is level. By packing informal institutions with loyalists, the Fidesz
government has used these institutions to shelter itself from regulation and has provided the
party with great advantages over opposing parties that may present serious challenges against
the Fidesz government in the future. Further, the Fidesz government has entrenched its
authority into informal institutions with the seemingly unlimited terms and replacement
procedures for officials that a new government would have difficulty passing without a
supermajority. Packing informal institutions with loyalists further entrenches Fidesz
government’s institutional power.
Controlling the Media
Stealth authoritarianism relies on controlling the media to block dissent, promote selfcensorship in journalists, and as an advantage for elections. The Fidesz government passed
legislation and packed institutions to gain control over the media. In 2010, Parliament passed
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two laws to regulate media: the Media Act and the Press Act, which are commonly referred
together as the Media Laws. 116 While the Media Act restructured the media regulatory
system by creating the Media Council and the Media Authority, the Press Act involved
media content and press regulation—both of these Acts are cardinal laws. The Media Laws
damage freedom of expression, media pluralism, and press independence.117 The new laws
provided the Media Authority and Council with tremendous amounts of power. In addition to
the Media Laws, Parliament passed a progressive tax on advertising revenue for media. The
Council of Europe’s Venice Commission commented on the Media Laws that, “[t]he three
legal texts under examination are extremely lengthy, complex and regulate virtually every
aspect of the media sphere.”118
The Media Laws use vague language that provides the Media Authority and the
Media Council with the legal ambiguity to facilitate arbitrary application of the law. For
example, Article 16 of the Press Act prohibits media content that violates “constitutional
order.” Throughout the Media Laws, the same vague language for illegal speech applies to
minorities,119 religion and political beliefs,120 and nearly every other category of speech.
Furthermore, the regulatory bodies do not have a set of guidelines for interpretation of illegal
content and application of sanctions.
The Media Act provides a variety of sanctions to media outlets, including fines,
suspensions of the outlet’s operations, deletion of the outlet from the media register or
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termination of the public contract on broadcasting services. 121 The maximum fine for a
media service provider with ‘significant market power’ is 200 million HUF (approximately
$724,000 USD), and the maximum fine for online media is 25 million HUF (approximately
$90,000 USD). Court proceedings do not have a suspensive effect on these fines as the
Media Council collects them regardless of a pending challenge in court.122 These large fines
have led journalists and media outlets to self-censor in fear that their outlet will not be able to
survive economically if they receive a large fine. The fact that the Fidesz Parliament elected
the members of the Media Council and the Media Authority increases the likelihood of selfcensorship. The result has been limited dissent and critique of the Fidesz government.
The Media Laws also require “balanced” coverage.123 Balanced coverage requires
news programs to clearly distinguish between facts and opinions.124 Once again, the term
balanced is incredibly vague and subjective. Requiring balanced coverage seems like
respectable request, but facts should be comprehensive and accurate rather than balanced. It
can be nearly impossible to separate fact from opinion in countless situations. For public
media services, the National News Agency (NNA) selects the news materials, and NNA is
the only authorized provider for public media.125 The Media Council Chairperson selects the
NNA director. Accordingly, well-informed or educated Hungarians with access to multiple
media sources consider public media services to be the mouthpiece for the Fidesz
government.126 However, many Hungarians living outside of Budapest in the countryside
either do not have access to Internet and other media sources or cannot afford media service
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subscriptions. So, the only news that many rural Hungarians receive is public news. This is a
sizeable population considering that 30 percent Hungarians live in rural areas.127 Rural
Hungarians do not have access to multiple sources of information and points of view. The
lack of information is dangerous and partially a reason why rural Hungarians have supported
the Fidesz party despite its authoritarian practices.
In another attempt to prevent diverse perspectives into Hungary, the Fidesz
government created a new advertisement tax for media outlets. This tax, however, was only
created to tackle one media outlet; this just so happens that this media outlet is the largest in
Hungary. On June 11, 2014, Parliament passed Act XXII on Advertisement Tax to create a
new progressive tax on media outlet’s advertising revenues. The taxation levels increase
based off an outlet’s net revenue, and the highest rate is set a 50 percent for outlets with
revenues exceeding 2 billion HUF.128 There is only one media outlet in Hungary, however,
that exceeds 2 billion HUF: the Luxembourg-based RTL Group, which is owned by Europe’s
largest media corporation, Bertelsmann.
Stealth authoritarian regimes attempt to control information and block dissent of their
authoritarian policies by controlling the media. Media control provides stealth authoritarian
regimes influence over the information received by voters. The Hungarian government has
blocked the public from accessing information and arguments from all sides of the political
spectrum. Freedom of the media is an essential democratic tool that provides the public with
necessary information for local and national debates that is necessary for votes to be
informed. The hefty fines issued through arbitrary Media Council decisions have prevented
national reporters from providing information to the public. The lack of information was
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apparent in the 2014 election and exacerbated by undue advantages that new election and
campaign laws provided to Fidesz incumbents.
Ruling-Party Turnover: Election Laws and Incumbent Advantages
Elections and the possibility electoral turnover are vital elements of democracy.
Electoral turnover allows the electoral process to respond to electoral preferences as well as
proves that the incumbent can lose his or her seat.129 Stealth authoritarian governments
provide the image that they have free and fair elections, but the outcomes are almost always
predetermined in the favor of the authoritarian party incumbents. These regimes will
reconfigure nearly every factor of an election to ensure that the current regime remains in
power. For instance, stealth authoritarian regimes often reconfigure the number legislative
seats, rules for counting votes, gerrymander, and rewrite campaign laws. All of these small
advantages working in unison provide the current regime with nearly insurmountable
advantages in elections.
As previously discussed, the disproportionate electoral law gave the Fidesz party 68
percent of seats in Parliament with 53 percent of the popular vote. In 2014, the Fidesz party
retained its supermajority with only 44 percent of the vote. During this Fidesz government’s
first four years in power, it passed a series of laws that would ensure that the Fidesz
government would retain its supermajority. Despite losing its supermajority by one seat in
2015 due to a special election held to replace a Fidesz MP after he was elected to the
European Commission, the laws effectively guaranteed the party held onto its supermajority
in 2014. Loss of its supermajority by one seat has still hardly prevented the Fidesz
government from acting as it pleases. It is nearly predetermined that the Fidesz government
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will find a way to regain its full supermajority in 2018, barring drastic changes to the current
regime, which do not appear likely.
One of the first acts the Fidesz government made after it gained power in 2010 was to
take control of the Election Commission. Parliament prematurely terminated the mandates of
Election Commission members who were elected through 2014. Formerly, five seats were
filled by a delegate from each party in Parliament while the other five members were filled
through mutual agreements made between the governing and opposition parties. The Fidesz
party filled all the seats not held by its delegates with Fidesz members. The Election
Commission also has the power to block referendums, which weakened civil society’s ability
to challenge the government. This was the first step to ensure that the 2014 elections results
went in the favor of Fidesz incumbents.
On the surface, the 2014 election appeared to be in line with European democratic
election standards. Voters were provided with a diverse option of candidates and votes were
recorded accurately. The Fidesz party, however, enjoyed undue advantages.130 These
advantages were created through election conduct regulated by the Fundamental Law, the
Act on Elections of All Members of Parliament (Election Act), and the Act on Election
Procedures (Election Procedures Act). First, the new election system reduced the number of
seats from 386 to 199, and the method of seat distribution was changed. Out of the 199 seats,
106 seats are decided through constituency districts in a one-round majority wins election.
The other 93 seats are allocated through a proportional system that is based off the national
popular vote for parties that break the 5 percent threshold.131 Under the previous electoral
system, unused votes from the district contests were allocated to the proportional contest
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based off the national vote. The new electoral system added the surplus votes from a winning
candidate in the district contest were also added to the proportional contest. This led to six
extra seats for the Fidesz-KNDP coalition.132 The reduction of seats also required redrawing
district lines. Redrawing district lines have been criticized by both the Council of Europe’s
Venice Commission and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
for its lack of transparency, independence and consultation, and as gerrymandering.133 In
addition, the district lines created through the Electoral Act were created as a cardinal law
and require a two-thirds majority to change the constituency lines. This tremendously
reduces the chances of a opposition party winning a majority in Parliament.
As for the campaign process, OSCE found the Fidesz incumbents “ enjoyed an undue
advantage because of restrictive campaign regulations, biased media coverage and campaign
activities that blurred the separation between political party and the State.”134 New media
laws and campaign advertising laws also provided Fidesz incumbents with an unfair
advantage over opposition candidates. The lack of critical reporting due to self-censorship
caused by the threat of substantial fines was exacerbated by the lack of independence in
public media, as previously discussed. The Fifth Amendment of the Fundamental Law passed
in September 2013 amended the Fourth Amendment’s limitations on political advertisements
after being pressured by European institutions to do so. However, the results were the same
even after the amendment. The Fourth Amendment only allowed political advertisements in
mass media if they were aired during the specified electoral campaign time period, in public
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service mass media, and for free. The Fifth Amendment allowed private mass media to show
political ads, but only during the campaign period and for free of charge. During the 2014
election, none of the Hungarian private broadcasters chose to provide free airtime for
campaign ads because of the current economic crisis in Hungary’s media industry.135 The
total lack of ads aired on private broadcasts deprived audiences and voters from a variety of
political messages.
Campaigns were nearly indiscernible in rural areas, and there was no clear separation
between the Fidesz political party and the government in terms of the campaign
advertisements used. The Fidesz incumbents took advantage of an uneven playing field when
the Fidesz party used the same slogan as a government campaign, “Hungary is performing
better,” that continued to be aired on private broadcasts. This campaign was produced over a
year prior to the election, and the rights were sold to the Fidesz party after it aired a
remarkably similar campaign ad. OSCE found this to be a clear violation of separation
between state and political party for election campaigns.136 The Media Council did not make
any decisions for “balanced coverage” violations even though there were complaints filed. If
examined independently, the electoral and campaign laws may appear to have had
inconsequential or only minor impacts on the elections. But the comprehensive examination
the interactive effects of the all the laws provide Fidesz incumbents with tremendous
advantages over opponents and ensured their supermajority in Parliament remained intact.
These laws and any future election laws should be analyzed after the 2018 election.
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Strength of Civil Society
Civil society organizations are one of the last lines of defense against authoritarian
and violations of freedoms. Civil society groups have the ability to exposure stealth
authoritarian regimes to international actors. Essentially, civil society can turn a stealth
authoritarian regime into simply an authoritarian regime. Civil society generally acts as a
watchdog over government actions and an informal check against the government. Stealth
authoritarian regimes weakened civil society’s governance role in various ways, like
intimidation or removing its influence in legislative processes. In some countries civil society
groups may have only a small presence, which stealth authoritarian regimes find ideal. The
Fidesz government found the best way to weaken civil society’s presence in Hungary was
through verbal attacks and violent intimidation.
In 2014, Prime Minister Orbán and other high-level government officials began to
accuse NGOs of being “political activists…paid by foreign interest groups.”137 Prime
Minister Orbán used these accusations to issue audits of 59 NGOs. The Government Control
Office carried out these audits. The Governmental Control Office’s legal authority to conduct
these audits is “seriously contested.”138 The primary dispute involves the European Economic
Area/Norway Grant NGO Fund, which is an important funder for NGOs that focus on human
rights, women’s rights, LGBT rights, environmental protection, and anti-corruption. In
August 2014, a criminal investigation was opened on NGOs connected with the Fund for

137

Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University and Student
Camp, 26 July 2014. http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-ministersspeeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-universityandstudent-camp
138

Amnesty International. “Their Backs to the Wall: Civil Society Under Pressure in Hungary.” 4.
http://www.amnesty.hu/data/file/756-back_to_the_walls_eur270012015_en.pdf?version=1412429919

58
allegedly committing financial crimes by contributing to political parties. In September of
that year, Ökotárs and DemNet—two NGOs funded by EEA/Norway grants—were raided.
The police seized their computers, servers and documents. Even worse, officers raided the
homes of NGO workers, searching the workers and seizing their computers.139 Four NGOs
were sanctioned in December 2014 for not cooperating with the audit that resulted in
suspension of their tax registration numbers.
There are larger implications for the assault on civil society. While civil society
groups are being pressured with sanctions and closures, the real problem in Fidesz’s attacks
on civil society is the limitation of freedom of association. After the raids, many NGOs were
deemed as toxic by government accusations and media reports. The negative image placed
upon these NGOs has led to loss of potential funders, clients and collaborators, and even
lawyers to represent them caused by fear of government attacks. 140 Moreover, as much of
the media has been forced to self-censor, civil society groups act as one of the few
independent voices able to offer to dissent and critique of the Fidesz government. As a result
of these direct attacks to civil society, the viability of publicly challenging government
policies and laws was dealt a substantial blow.
The ability to use referendums as challenges against the government was also
undermined. The Fidesz government packed the Election Commission with its party
members. The Election Commission was given the power to block referendums. A key
function of civil society’s role in national democracies is to bolster transparent governance
and challenge government policies that violate human rights, fundamental freedoms,
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democracy and rule of law—whether these alleged violations pertain to domestic or
international law. In Hungary, referendums that are conducted through popular votes are a
vital tool for civil society to derail any government policies that violate human rights,
fundamental freedoms, democracy and rule of law. The Election Commission’s power to
arbitrarily block referendums potentially eliminates civil society’s role to check the
government. Decisions made by the Commission can be appealed to the Constitutional Court.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the Commission’s decisions will be overturned due to the
lack of independence of the Constitutional Court.
Conclusions
The Fidesz government has successfully built a stealth authoritarian government. In
its authoritarian reversal, this regime has used stealth authoritarian tactics as it worked
through democratic channels, or at least the façade of democratic channels, such
constitutional amendments, constitutional drafting process, judicial and institutional
appointments and elections. The Fidesz government has methodically consolidated power
into the hands of Prime Minister Orbán. The principle tool for this government has been its
supermajority in Parliament. Despite the presence of multiple parties, the Fidesz government
has constructed a single-party state. Initially, the Fidesz supermajority in Parliament was a
legitimate choice made by the electorate in 2010. However, the Fidesz government has used
this authority for undemocratic ends and has abolished all oppositional debate and input in
governance.
Democratic pillars have been torn down for authoritarian ones. Nearly all checks
against the government have been removed. The government dismantled the Constitutional
Court’s power to check Parliament and the executive branch. The Fidesz government did so
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by removing the independence of the Court and eradicating its judicial review powers that
could obstruct the executive branch’s consolidation of power. Informal public institutions
were given additional powers and packed with Fidesz loyalists for with open-ended term
limits. The public institutions no longer operated with the public’s interest in mind. Rather,
they function in accordance with Fidesz rule. The demanding procedure to amend Cardinal
Laws has also entrenched this government’s rule and policies for the unforeseeable future.
Media laws and regulatory bodies have silenced media dissent and critique of the
government. The lack of information has had spilled over into elections and campaigns.
Election and campaign laws have nearly assured that the Fidesz government will be able to
withstand electoral processes and remain in power. Finally, this regime has both legally and
physically attacked entities representing civil society, obstructed civil society groups ability
to access information of government activities and spending, and grasped control over
referendums.
Each of these actions viewed independently might cause one to believe that these are
isolated instances violating democratic principles and rule of law. Prime Minister Orbán and
his government have consciously made each of these actions with greater intentions of
building an authoritarian government. EU institutions have weighed the Fidesz government’s
actions in this independent fashion. This is a principal reason for the EU’s inaction and
inability to prevent Hungary’s authoritarian reversal. The EU has hardly acknowledged these
actions and has only intervened in a few instances. Regardless, the EU has been unable to
alter the authoritarian path of the Fidesz government and protect its democratic values found
in Article 2.
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Case Study: Romania
In July 2012, it appeared that Prime Minister Victor Ponta was going to take Romania
down the same path towards authoritarianism as Hungary. Prime Minister Ponta and his
center-left Social Liberal Union (USL) Government instituted emergency ordinances—even
in the absence of legitimate emergency—that resulted in replacing the Speakers of both
Parliamentary Chambers, firing the ombudsman, prohibiting the Constitutional Court from
reviewing Parliament’s actions, and threatening the Court’s judges with impeachment. As
democracy and rule of law were being violated, Prime Minister Ponta and the Parliament
were in the process of impeaching President Traian Basescu. The means of the Ponta
Government’s consolidation of power draw comparisons to the Viktor Orbán and the Fidesz
government; however, the end results were far different. Ultimately, the Ponta Government
was thwarted by Romania’s Constitutional Court and pressures from the EU. The Ponta
Government in Romania has employed several similar stealth authoritarian tactics used by
the Fidesz government in Hungary. Nonetheless, Romania has not experienced an
authoritarian reversal. Political turmoil and consistent ruling party changes have prevented a
single faction from gaining a foothold strong enough for an authoritarian. In addition, the
extra checks in the structure of Romania’s government, in comparison to Hungary, have
played a consequential role. This section will demonstrate that certain elements of stealth
authoritarianism must be present for others to be achieved.

Figure 2: The Structure of Romania’s Governmental Branches
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The Romanian government has been a perpetual violator of democratic principles and
rule of law, even after its accession into the European Union in 2007. The complexity of
Romania’s government structure (as shown in Figure 2) in comparison to Hungary has
prevented a single leader or political party to consolidate power and thoroughly entrench
itself into government structures for the long haul. Political turmoil has also been a crucial
factor in preventing a single faction for gaining tremendous amounts of power. Much of the
political turmoil has been caused by the poor condition of Romania’s economy and the
austerity measures that followed the 2008 global economic crisis, but public protests have
also led to several Prime Minister resignations.
In contrast to Hungary, the President’s Office in Romania is a strong check against
other political branches. Ironically, this check was implemented by the country’s former
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communist leader, Nicolae Ceausescu, who was later executed when the Soviet-supported
communist regime fell in Romania in 1989. Ceausescu created a full-blown executive
presidency in 1974 by raising the status of the president of the State Council. The executive
branch is divided into two sections: the President and the Government. The Government
refers to Prime Minister’s Office, Cabinet of Ministers and the majority party or coalition in
Parliament. Unlike the ceremonial President of Hungary, the President of Romania has far
greater powers that are similar powers to the President of the United States. The Romanian
President is Commander-in-Chief over the armed forces. The president has power to veto
legislation, grant pardons, institute states of emergency, dissolve Parliament, and call on
Parliament for referendums. The President is elected to five-year terms and can serve only
two terms. The President also is responsible for nominating a Prime Minister candidate from
the majority party or coalition when the Government has a change in power, which then goes
to Parliament for a vote. The President can also be impeached for severe violations of the
Constitution. Presidential impeachment processes have greatly affected Romanian politics in
the past decade.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of Sovietoccupation in Romania, the country drafted and adopted the 1991 Constitution to mark its
transition to democracy. In 2003, several revisions were made to the 1991 Constitution for
Romania’s integration into the European Union. The amended Constitution was adopted
through a referendum that took place on October 18, 2003. Despite opposition and NGO
allegations that the vote was rigged, the amendments came into force ten days later. The
points of contention by these groups were over the voter turnout and the results. The
minimum referendum threshold of 51 percent of eligible voters was barely met, as there was
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a 55 percent turnout. Also, the final tally was 91 percent in favor and 9 percent opposed to
the amendments. The massive margin of victory raised suspicions. Neither of these claims
has been substantiated nor have they been brought to court. The referendum process in
Romania over the next decade would be a major point of contention.
Table 2: Stealth Authoritarian Indicators
Emergency Ordinances
Strength of the Judiciary141
Strength of Formal Institutions and
Government Checks
Informal Institutions
Control over Mass Media
Strength of Civil Society

Emergency Ordinances
Moderate
Emergency Ordinances
Difficult to Pack due to frequent Government
changes
Control is Not Centralized, but media often
suffers from a lack of independence
Historically Weak and Underfunded

Use of Law and Constitutional Loopholes for Executive Branch Consolidation
Since Victor Ponta was appointed as Prime Minister in 2012, Ponta has had two
primary objectives. First, Prime Minister Ponta was determined to impeach President Traian
Basescu, who was the man who nominated him as Prime Minister. Second, he sought to
weaken the Constitutional Court’s judicial review power over Parliament’s actions. Prime
Minister Ponta, however, has not been the only Prime Minister to attempt to replace the
President as well as undermine the judiciary. Prime Minister Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu also
attempted to impeach President Basescu in 2007. While the Fidesz government’s
consolidation power comes form its Parliamentary supermajority, the Romanian
Government’s consolidation power comes from issuing emergency ordinances. Emergency
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ordinances allow the Government to bypass Parliament and implement law, which are known
as legislative delegation power.
Article 115 of the Constitution specifies two types of government ordinances. First,
paragraphs 1 to 3 of Article 115 provides legislative delegation powers to the Government:
(1) Parliament may pass a special law enabling the Government to issue ordinances in
fields outside the scope of organic laws. (2) The enabling law shall compulsorily
establish the field and the date up to which ordinances may be issued. (3) If the
establishing law so requests, ordinances shall be submitted to Parliament for
approval, according to the legislative procedure, until the expiry of the enabling time
limit. Non-compliance with the term entails discontinuation of the effects of the
ordinance.142

These three paragraphs give the Government the authority to issue laws outside the scope of
organic laws. Organic laws in Romania are similar to cardinal laws in Hungary. Organic laws
regulate areas of higher importance to Romania than ordinary laws. Organic laws address
national borders, citizenship, organization of Government bodies, political parties, and
organization and functioning of the courts. Organic laws are also similar to cardinal laws in
that they require higher standards for amending or enacting as compared to ordinary laws.
The hierarchy of laws in Romania starts with ordinary laws at the bottom, then organic laws,
then constitutional laws at the top with the highest authority.
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Second, paragraphs 4 to 8 of Article 115 allows the Government to adopt emergency
ordinances without a delegation from Parliament.143 Paragraph 4 states that “[t]he
Government can only adopt emergency ordinances in exceptional cases, the regulation of
which cannot be postponed, and have the obligation to give the reasons for the emergency
status within their contents.” It appears, however, that the Government’s frequent use of
emergency ordinances indicates abuse of this mechanism. Since 2000, there has consistently
been over 100 emergency ordinances issued annually and in several years there have been
over 200 issued. The emergency ordinance procedure allows these ordinances to remain in
force unless the second and deciding Chamber of Parliament explicitly rejects it. The
Parliamentary majority can keep the emergency ordinance in force by delaying the vote in
the two Chambers in Parliament. This has been the cause of government abuses as well as
such a high frequency of emergency ordinances issued in recent years.
Article 115 does place two specific limitations on emergency ordinances. Paragraph 6
does not allow these ordinances to pertain to constitutional laws, fundamental State
institutions, rights or freedoms set forth in the Constitution, electoral rights, nor forcible
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transfer of assets into public property. The second limitation stems from the reference to
organic law quorum procedure found in paragraph 5. Article 76(1) requires a higher quorum
procedure for organic laws where there must be an absolute majority in each Chamber rather
than a relative majority used for ordinary laws. Moreover, a strong and independent
Constitutional Court is crucial to prevent the Government’s abuse of emergency ordinances.
Strength of the Judiciary
The Constitutional Court was an incredibly weak institution and did not play much of
a role in the democratization process throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. The Romanian
Constitutional Court was the only court of the same stature in the region that did not have
final arbiter powers over constitutional matters—the Polish Constitutional Tribunal also did
not have final arbiter status until 1997. Article 145 of the 1991 allowed the Court’s decisions
to be overruled by a two-thirds vote in Parliament. Parliament would rarely consider the
Court’s decisions as mandatory.144 The Court also did not have the jurisdiction to settle
conflicts between public institutions. Parliament had decision-making supremacy over all
constitutional matters for over a decade during Romania’s democratic transition. It was not
until the 2003 constitutional amendments that the Constitutional Court began to reflect those
of the same authority throughout the European Union. Romania altered the Constitution to
bring the Court’s powers in line with EU norms and requirements for accession. Most
importantly, the amendments removed Parliaments ability to override Constitutional Court
decisions. Not only did the Court begin to decide on constitutional matters, but also the
nature of its legitimacy elicited political debates that began to consider constitutional
boundaries. This was a novel concept in Romania since liberal democracy and
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constitutionalism were relatively new in the transitioning state. On several occasions, the
Court has showed its strength and stood up against the Government’s misuse of power.
The Court began to establish itself through a series a constitutional crises that began
as the incumbent National Liberal Government started the impeachment process of President
Basescu in 2007. The Prime Minister at the time, Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu, and his
Government began the impeachment process for charges alleging unconstitutional
presidential activism and involvement in inner-party struggles. Parliament voted to suspend
President Basescu. Article 95(1) of the Constitution states that presidential impeachments can
only result from “grave acts infringing upon Constitutional provisions.” In an advisory
opinion, the Court ruled that the acts committed by President Basescu could not be
considered “grave.”145 This advisory opinion, however, was not needed because 75 percent
of votes cast in the referendum (the final impeachment step) were in opposition of the
impeachment. Basescu was reinstated as President after his 30-day suspension. Furthermore,
the Court established its presence and likely would have overturned the impeachment had
President Basescu not won the referendum.
Another impeachment attempt of President Basescu took place in 2012, this time by
Prime Minister Victor Ponta and his USL Government. The impeachment attempt occurred
in multiple stages and involved legal maneuvering by the Government. The first step was an
attempt to remove the Constitutional Court’s review powers. On July 4, 2012, the Romanian
Government issued an emergency ordinance to eliminate the Constitutional Court’s power to
check the constitutionality of laws passed by Parliament.146 The ordinance amended Article
27(1) of Law 47/1992 on the Organisation and Operation of the Constitutional Court. In
145
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June 2012, 67 MPs challenged the constitutionality of a law that amended that same Article.
Due to this pending challenge before the Constitutional Court, the law did not come into
force. Yet, the adoption of the emergency ordinance, which had the exact same content as the
challenged law, removed the Court’s ability to review the law. The Constitutional Court
pushed back against the Government emergency ordinance. The Court ruled on July 9 that
the law to amend Article 27(1) was unconstitutional, the adoption of the emergency
ordinance was unconstitutional, and the Government behavior was abusive towards to
Court.147
The Government issued another emergency ordinance the following day—July 5,
2012. The ordinance amended referendum procedures in Article 10 of Law No.3/2000 on the
Organisation of the Referendum.148 This emergency ordinance eliminated the 51 percent
voter turnout requirement for presidential impeachment referendums. The emergency
ordinance lowered the bar for impeachment referendums: “the dismissal of the President of
Romania is approved if it meets the majority of valid votes of the citizens that took part in the
referendum.”149 The Court ruled against the amendment and required that presidential
impeachment referenda require that the President’s removal from office must met the same
standard that he or she is elected, 51 percent of the population must participate for the vote to
be valid.150
While the Ponta Government was attempting to amend to impeachment process, it
just so happened that Parliament was in the process of suspending President Basescu for
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allegedly overstepping his powers with illegal phone taps, using security forces against
political enemies and pressuring prosecutors in criminal cases. Parliament voted on July 6,
2012, to suspend President Basescu for 30 days. While Prime Minister Ponta was attempting
to impeach President Basescu in July 2012, he also removed the speakers of both Chambers
of Parliament and replaced them with political allies. Ponta also replaced the Ombudsman
with one of his choosing. According to Article 98 of the Constitution, after the President is
suspended, the Speaker of the Senate and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies become
the interim President until the impeachment referendum is organized. Given both the
Speakers were members of parties that supported President Basescu, Parliament removed the
Speakers and replaced them with political allies. The Ombudsman has the authority to
challenge emergency ordinances issued by the Government. Therefore, he was removed from
office, and replaced with a new ombudsman who did not challenge any emergency ordinance
issued during this period.
Moreover, Prime Minister Ponta and Parliament were changing the rules of
impeachment while the process had already begun. The impeachment referendum took place
on July 29, and nearly 90 percent of the votes cast were in favor of impeaching Basescu.
However, the 51 percent quorum was not met because only 46 percent of eligible voters
participated in the referendum. On August 21, 2012, the Constitutional Court made its
decision on the impeachment. The Court found the referendum to be void, because it did not
meet the required quorum. In a game of tug of war, the Government also chose to selectively
publish Court decisions in the Official Gazette, which ultimately made the decision
ineffective. Romanian court decisions are not effective and binding until they have been
published in the Official Gazette. The decision was later published after the European
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Commission chastised the Government. President Basescu was re-installed back into office,
and ultimately the Ponta Government accepted the Court’s decision.151
Not from a lack of effort, the Ponta Government has been unable to consolidate
power and remove the Constitutional Court’s judicial review powers. In contrast to the
Hungarian Constitutional Court, there has been no restructuring of the Court or changes in
appointment procedures. The Court is comprised of nine justices that serve nine-year terms
that cannot be prolonged or renewed. Three justices are appointed by the Chamber of
Deputies, three by the Senate and three by the President. The Constitutional Court renews
three justices every three years. The Court’s organization laws carefully safeguard its
independence and prevent packing the Court by a particular branch.
The ordinary courts in Romania—the High Court of Cassation and Justice, Superior
Court of Magistry, Court of Appeals, the Tribunal Courts, and Courts of First Instance—have
not endured the same independence. Several judges in these courts have been charged and
convicted of corruption. Romania’s accession into the EU came with the Union’s
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) that monitors the Member State’s progress.
A primary CVM focus has been the rampant corruption in Romania. Public official
corruption is monitored and investigated by National Anticorruption Directorate. Despite
debates about the effectiveness and independence of courts in corruption cases, hundreds of
public officials and several judges have been convicted of corruption. Even Prime Minister
Ponta is not immune from corruption investigations. In July 2015, Ponta was charged with
corruption for allegedly committing fraud, tax evasion and money laundering dating back to
his time as a lawyer before he became Prime Minister in 2012. He is the first Prime Minister
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to stand trial while in office.152 Corruption trials are slow moving in Romania; the trial is
currently in progress, as of October 2015.
On October 30, 2015, a fire broke out in a Bucharest nightclub during a performance
by a local band. The fire killed 56 people and hundreds were injured.153 A wave of protests
broke out in Bucharest—a some of which were the largest since the fall of communism in
1989—that charged the government with corruption, inaction and ineptitude in the wake of
the tragedy. Protesters accused the government of being too lax in issuing permits and failing
to sufficiently inspect public venues. 154 As a result of the protest, Prime Minister Ponta
resigned on November 4, 2015. In his resignation statement, Ponta said, “I have the
obligation to acknowledge that there is legitimate anger in society. In my years as a
politician, I put up a fight in any battle with political opponents. However, I won’t put up a
fight against the people.”155 Ponta’s Cabinet was replaced two weeks later, and Parliament
elected Dacian Ciolos, a political independent, as Prime Minister.
Prime Minister Ponta was unable to establish a key component of stealth
authoritarian—consolidation of power into the executive branch and removal of formal
checks from other branches of government. The Constitutional Court maintained its strength
and independence to prevent this from occurring. From this point, a stealth authoritarian
regime will face severe difficulties to establish the other components of authoritarianism. The
regime will likely be unable to pack informal institutions without contestations, ensure the
regime maintains its power through elections, and control the media. These components have
also been obstructed by political turmoil and consistent regime changes in Romania. Despite
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a legitimate authoritarian challenge in Romania, the current situation shows its democratic
deficits and vulnerability of an authoritarian reversal.
Ruling-Party Turnover and Packing Public Institutions with Loyalists
Political turmoil and frequent regime changes in Romania has not allowed political
elites to thoroughly pack public institutions with loyalists. Prime Minister Ponta and his
Government have challenged democratic principles and rule of law, but the Government has
not successfully consolidated power in the executive branch. The has been, in part, caused
strength and independence of the Constitutional Court, checks from the Presidency and the
opposition party checks in Parliament. The inability for any government faction to
consolidate power in Romanian politics has been affected by political turmoil. The nightclub
fire protests and Ponta’s resignation are the most recent examples of political turbulence.
Political stability in Romania has been incredibly volatile in recent years. Political
turmoil has been partially caused by the recent crackdown on corruption, but much the
turmoil has been caused by economic instability. There were three Governments in 2012.
Prime Minister Emil Boc (Democratic Liberal Party) and his cabinet resigned in February
2012 following weeks of protests against austerity measures and surviving several votes of
no confidence. In April 2012, Prime Minister Mihai Razvan Ungureanu’s Government was
forced out of office after a vote of no confidence in Parliament. President Basescu then
appointed Social Democrat Victor Ponta as interim Prime Minister, who was later voted into
office when the Social Democratic Party and its coalition won the Parliamentary majority in
December 2012.
The National Anticorruption Directorate and CVM have closely watched state
institutions and public officials. From March 2013 to March 2014, Romanian courts decided
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on 281 convictions of corruptions against 857 people in this period. This included Cabinet
Ministers, MPs, mayors, and former Prime Minister Adrian Nastase received his second
corruption conviction.156 Prime Minister Nastase resigned in March 2006 due to corruption
charges that he was later convicted of in 2012. In 2014, 23 judges, including four judges on
the High Court of Cassation and Justice, six Chief prosecutors and six prosecutors were
indicted on corruption charges.157 The National Anticorruption Directorate has begun
investigations of over 4,200 corruption allegations in this same time span. These corruption
charges and convictions are not likely the attacks to political opponents from a single regime
due to the fact that there has not been a consistent coalition in power since 1996 when the
neo-communist coalition lost its majority.
State of the Media and Elections
The economic crisis has hit the Romanian media hard. Advertising revenues fell
sharply, and several media companies reported that their advertising revenues dropped by 70
to 80 percent from 2008 to 2009.158 Media groups began to cuts jobs and wages. Some
groups cut entire sections, like the editorials, and went from daily to bi-weekly or weekly.159
Investigative journalism steadily disappeared due to the industry’s poor financial status. 160
Article 31 of Romanian’s Constitution guarantees the right to information, but government
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officials have frequently blocked journalists from accessing information in corruption
cases.161
The effects of the economic crisis on the diminished media landscape have allowed
certain politicians to use the media to push their political agenda. Former Senator and media
magnate Dan Voiculescu founded one of the largest media conglomerates in Romania—
Intact Media Group. Vioculescu also founded the Romanian Conservative Party (PC), which
is part of the USL coalition that currently has the majority in Parliament. There was
widespread criticism claiming that Vioculescu used his media conglomerate for the
impeachment campaign of President Basescu in 2012. There is an inherent conflict of interest
when a Senator and political party founder has control over one of the largest media groups
in Romania. Vioculescu was later convicted of corruption and money laundering and
sentenced to ten years in prison—a reoccurring theme for Romanian politics. The
imprisoned Vioculescu was facing corruption charges again in 2014. His media outlets
repeatedly attacked the chief anticorruption prosecutor who was pursuing graft charges
against him. Other news outlets have been impacted by political influence as well. In July
2014, a news station owned by Romania cable and satellite behemoth RCS-RDS fired
reporter Cristi Citre after he criticized Prime Minister Ponta on his personal Facebook page.
As diversity in traditional media source outlets has faded away, many Romanians
have chosen to use the Internet for news. Over 50 percent of the population used the Internet
for news in 2014.162 The problem is that only a few online news outlets in the country are
profitable. Online outlets cannot afford to conduct original reporting. Instead, they generally
act as consolidators of already reported news, which limits the media pluralism and diversity.
161
162

Ibid.
Ibid.

76
To make matters worse for Romania’s media landscape, reporters are often intimidated,
verbally abused and threatened with physical harm by the police as well as the public. In
November 2014, police arrested and beat reporter Stefan Mako who works for the online
news site Casa Jurnalistului after he recorded police arresting a man in Bucharest. In August
of that year, protesters attacked three journalists as they covered a rally. These attacks have
damaged journalists ability and courage to cover certain news topics.
Like the Hungarians, the Romanian public suffers from a lack of information due to
self-censoring journalists, and news is often dominated by political attacks. The media,
however, does not suffer from the same packing of regulatory and monitoring bodies with
government loyalists as in Hungary. The National Audiovisual Council (CNA) is the sole
media regulatory body in Romania. There are 11 members in the Council, and their
appointments are as follows: three appointments for the Senate, three from the House of
Deputies, two from the President and three from the Government. There are allegations that
the Council is politicized, its decisions are often arbitrary and it is overall ineffective.
Regardless, a single branch or political faction does not appear to have direct control over
CNA.
The Government and Parliamentary majority are responsible for selecting the
leadership for the public broadcaster. Freedom House reported that this selection led to proGovernment bias in media coverage for the 2014 Presidential election.163 There was also a
lack of transparency in the allocation of public advertising funds provided by the EU for the
2014 presidential election.164 It is still difficult to thoroughly assess the impact this coverage
had on the Romanian public, especially due to the history of the Romanian citizenry’s
163
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distrust of public institutions and lack of civic engagement.165 Although the state of
Romania’s media appears to be in disarray, one political faction does not appear to have
control and dominance over the media like the system the Fidesz government created in
Hungary. There are conflicts of interests that suggest absence of media independence in some
cases. Indeed, there are several instances of apparent government pressure on the media and
the news outlet caving to the government pressure. For instance, firing a journalist for his
critique of a government official on a private Facebook account threatens media
independence and promotes self-censorship. However, the state of the media in Romania
does not suggest systematic control exhibited in authoritarian states. Influence over the media
is too fractured, and there is not one clear political faction in control.
Civil Society
Civil society has not been able to completely and consistently entrench itself in
Romania since the 1989 transition. At times, civil society has been part of democratic
processes, particularly after the National Salvation Front (FSN) lost its majority in the 1996
parliamentary elections. The National Salvation Front Romania quickly grasped power after
Ceausescu was executed in 1989. But the regime changes that resulted over the next two
decades made it difficult for civil society groups to create specific plans of attack other than
its focus on corruption. Just as the media industry, civil society in Romania has been
weakened by the country’s economic situation. Civil society groups have been historically
underfunded in Romania. Moreover, civil society has remained relatively weak in Romania
over the past three decades.
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Following Prime Minister Ponta’s resignation, for the first time in the history of
Romania’s young democracy the President has promised to consult civil society in
appointing the new prime minister.166 Current President Iohannis invited civil society
representatives to consultation meetings for selecting nominees. Civil society representatives
included individuals from Freedom House, Funky Citizens, Hope and Homes for Children
Romania, and Salvati Dunarea Si Delta. The President’s inclusion of civil society in the
process was in response to the ongoing protests of the Bucharest nightclub fire. On
November 6, 2015, President Iohannis said, “I believed that, in this situation, when the street
played a decisive role, when civil society formulated demands, requests, specific, it was very
important to have this meeting.”167 These protests have provided the citizenry and civil
society with momentum as a legitimate force in governance in Romania, but one should not
hastily declare that civil society organizations will continue to be a factor in Romania’s
democratic processes. This may just be a move to appease the protestors. It is best to wait
and see whether civil society’s strength continues to grow in Romania.
Conclusions
No political faction in Romanian politics has been able to build an authoritarian
regime since the state began democratizing in 1989. Nevertheless, Romania suffers from
democratic deficits and rule of law violations in several areas. The Government has
repeatedly abused its emergency ordinance powers in attempts to expand its powers and legal
authority beyond the normal constraints of law. However, the Constitutional Court has
blocked the Government on multiple occasions and has proved that the Court can be a
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legitimate political check. The Constitutional Court’s check against the Prime Minister’s
consolidation of power is a principal factor to prevent Romania’s authoritarian reversal. In
contrast to Hungary’s structure, Romania has far more political branches and actors to
prevent consolidation of power into one branch. The state’s strong Presidency has been an
essential check against the limited separation between Parliament and the Prime Minister’s
Office as well. Due to political turmoil and divisions between factions, packing informal
institutions with loyalists has not occurred in Romania. Certain leaders may exercise stealth
authoritarian tactics in a few areas, but because several of these components are lacking and
do not interact together Romania’s government cannot be considered a stealth authoritarian
regime.
There is still much democratic progress to be made in Romania, and the state is still
teetering between democratic consolidation and backsliding to authoritarianism. Corruption
is rampant and the legal process is often ineffective in these cases. The state of the media
appears to be poor in several areas. Civil society plays a small role to check the government
and promote transparency. This is caused by the Romanian public’s historic limited
engagement in civic activity and underfunded civil society groups, but its presence is
growing. Despite these democratic deficits, Romania’s government cannot be classified as
authoritarian. There is no clear political faction that systematically controls branches of
branches of government, informal institutions, the media, civil society or election processes.
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International Organization Enforcement Mechanisms
International organizations are frequently criticized as having weak enforcement
mechanisms to ensure that their laws and principles are respected. This section applies three
hypotheses to the previous case studies with respect to EU enforcement mechanisms. First,
IOs direct enforcement mechanisms are weak and cannot force a member state to comply
with IO rules, because IOs do not have mechanisms to intervene with force. Next, indirect
economic and political pressures applied by IOs do not promote long-term democratic
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consolidation in transiting countries and cannot stop an authoritarian reversal. Both direct
and indirect enforcements measures are weaker than the threat of withholding membership
during the pre-accession period. Finally, IOs with limited monitoring mechanisms can fail to
adequately recognize or control an authoritarian reversal. The theory that IOs cannot prevent
authoritarian reversals is confirmed in the case of Hungary. The EU has been unable to
prevent Hungary from reverting to authoritarianism under the Fidesz regime because of weak
enforcement mechanisms and the lack of EU institutional monitoring. It is still unclear
whether EU institutions will be able to promote long-term consolidation of democracy in
Romania.
The EU has direct means of enforcing its laws and fundamental values with Article 7
of the Treaty of the European Union and its infringement procedures. EU institutions also use
indirect means of enforcement—political and economic pressures—that are used more often
than the direct mean of enforcements. Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union
establishes democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
including the rights of minorities, as the Union’s fundamental values that are common to all
Member States. EU institutions have limited direct enforcement mechanisms to stop or
prevent authoritarian reversals. The primary enforcement instrument is the preventative and
sanctioning mechanisms found Article 7 TEU, which is known as the “nuclear option.”
Article 7 has both preventative and sanctioning mechanisms. The preventative mechanisms is
found in Article 7 (1):
On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the European
Parliament or by the European Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of four
fifths of its members after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may
determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the
values referred to in Article 2. Before making such a determination, the Council shall
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hear the Member State in question and may address recommendations to it, acting in
accordance with the same procedure.
Paragraphs 2-3 of the Article provide the sanctioning mechanisms where the European
Council can revoke certain membership rights, including voting rights for Member States in
the European Parliament. This mechanism, however, has incredibly demanding procedures
for determining violations and is often obstructed by politics in EU institutions. Article 7’s
sanctioning powers have never been used on a Member State. Therefore, the nuclear option
operates primarily as a threat.
The other direct enforcement mechanism is the infringement procedure.168 The EU’s
European Commission initiates infringement proceedings against Member States suspected
of violating EU law. Infringement procedures can either be resolved through Early
Settlement or through the Formal Procedure, which has five potential steps. The first step of
the Formal Procedure is the European Commission issues a letter of formal notice where the
Member State has two months to comment and respond with the noncompliance problem. If
the Member State does not respond, the Commission state’s why it believes the Member
State has violated EU law, and the government has two months to comply. Third, if a
Member State still does not comply, the Commission will refer the case to the Court of
Justice of the European Union (ECJ). The Commission can ask the ECJ to impose a lump
sum and/or a penalty payment on the Member State. Fourth, the ECJ will decide whether the
Member State has violated EU law if there is still noncompliance. If so, the Member State is
required to change its laws or practices as soon as possible in accordance with the ECJ
judgment. Finally, if the Member State still does not comply, the case is returned to the ECJ,
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and at this time the Commission can request additional lump sum and/or penalty payments
for noncompliance.
The indirect enforcement, or enforcement measures that are outside the scope of EU
formal procedures, that are typically issued by the EU are social pressure, multilateral
economic pressure from other IOs, and issue linkage. Social pressure can be applied from EU
institutions as well as other Member States. Social pressure is almost always applied from
one or both of these actors above when a Member State is suspected of violating EU law.
Issue linkage is a tool used by IOs to increase its leverage over a non-compliant Member
State. Issue linkage ties compliance to access to treaty membership or economic packages.
Withholding economic packages often occurs multilaterally between multiple IOs. For
instance, the EU will link Member State compliance to an International Monetary Fund-EU
economic package. The primary enforcement tactics used against Hungary’s authoritarian
backsliding have been infringement procedures, issue linkage, and social pressure. These
tactics used by the EU, however, have not been able to prevent Hungary’s authoritarian
reversal. The main enforcement tactics used in Romania have been post-accession
monitoring and evaluating and issue linkage. The following section examines the
effectiveness of EU enforcement mechanisms when applied to Hungary and Romania’s
democratic backsliding and violations of EU law.
EU Enforcement Mechanisms in Hungary and Romania
The EU has had difficulties framing valid legal arguments against the Fidesz
leadership in Hungary. The Fidesz party legally rose to power through fair and free elections
in 2010. Also, the Fidesz government has used constitutional loopholes and legal
maneuverings to create its constitutional order. In 2012, the European Commission found
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violations of EU law in Hungarian legislation and started an infringement procedure against
the Member State in three issue areas: lowering of judicial retirement ages, the independence
of the data protection ombudsman, and the independence of the central bank. The ECJ found
that Hungary’s law that lowered the retirement age of judges, prosecutors and notaries
constituted unjustified age discrimination.169 This is problematic because the EU has not
addressed the systemic issue of Hungary’s authoritarian governance practices and other
means that weaken the Constitutional Court’s strength and independence.
The Fidesz government incrementally complied with the ECJ decision for lowering
the judicial retirement age and slightly changed its law. The retirement age for judges was
changed to 65 and the retirement process would take place over ten years, instead of retiring
at 62 over a one-year process. In April 2014, the ECJ ruled that changes to Hungary’s data
protection administration led to the unlawful replacement of the data protection
ombudsman.170 The Fidesz Parliament removed the mandate of the data protection
ombudsman, András Jóri, two years before his six-year term expired in 2014. On Jan.1, 2012,
the independent data protection ombudsman institution was replaced with the National
Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (NADPFI). Officials of NADPFI
are appointed by Parliament. Because ombudsman institutions exist to check legislatures and
guarantee fundamental rights are ensured in legislation, the independence of the institution
has been compromised by replacing the institution. The ECJ found that EU Council Directive
95/46 requires that Member States guarantee the independence of authorities responsible for
the protection of personal data. To date, there has been no real compliance with the ECJ
ruling and the data protection authority still lies in the hands of the National Authority for
169
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Data Protection and Freedom of Information, which is headed by a Fidesz loyalist for a nineyear term. If the European Commission wants to address this issue again, the matter can be
returned to the ECJ once again.
While the retirement age of judges and the independence of the data protection
authority were partially resolved through ECJ decisions, the issue with the independence of
Hungary’s Central Bank was resolved in a different manner and reference to the ECJ was not
necessary. The European Commission used an infringement procedure that included the
possibility of ECJ fines, but the Commission also used issue linkage in the matter. In
December 2011, the EU and IMF made negotiations on a €15-20 billion financial assistance
package contingent on Hungary restoring the independence its Central Bank. Once again, the
Fidesz government packed the Central Bank’s key decision-makers with Fidesz loyalists, like
the interest-rate setting committee and the head of the Central bank. In April 2012, the
European Commission was satisfied with the changes made to the Central Bank’s legal
status, and the issue by not brought before the ECJ. Over the past two years (2014-2015),
however, the European Central Bank has criticized the Central Bank’s independence as
Parliament and the Prime Minister still have control to choose head of the bank and its key
decision-makers.171
Political pressure has also been ineffective to persuade Hungary’s undemocratic
practices. When democracy and rule of law are challenged, Prime Minister Orbán has
frequently countered by challenging the democratic accountability of EU institutions:
I was elected, the Hungarian government was also elected, as well as the European
Parliament…But who elected the European Commission? What is its democratic
171
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legitimacy? And to whom is the European Parliament responsible? This is a very
serious problem in the new European architecture.172
Prime Minister Orbán has continuously deflected political pressures and has pointed to
democratic practices in other Member States to placate external criticisms. The best example
is the government’s response to criticisms of the Media Laws that were passed in 2010. After
EU institutions and the Venice Commission addressed specific concerns with the Media
Laws, the Hungarian government released two documents that listed 20 European countries
and EU-Member States as examples for precedents for each concern brought by the
institutions.
Central European University’s Center for Media and Communications Studies
researched each of the 20 example countries and their corresponding laws.173 The study
found that a majority of examples given “omit or inaccurately characterise relevant factors of
the other countries’ regulatory systems, and as a result, the examples do not provide
sufficient and/or equivalent comparisons to Hungary’s media regulation system.”174 For
example, European institutions criticized the sanctioning powers of Hungary’s Media
Authority over all media. In response, the Fidesz government listed 15 countries as
precedents that sanction media—in some combination—with fines, suspensions, license
revocations and/or terminations.175 However, the study’s experts found that Hungary’s Media
Authority’s sanctioning scope was inconsistent with every country listed. The evaluation
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found various regulatory bodies and/or the courts, which oversee a specific media sector, that
impose media sanctions in the example countries, while Hungary’s Media Authority has
sanctioning power over all media sectors and have sole decision-making power. Hungary has
frequently adjusted its media laws due to external pressures and criticism from European
institutions, but it appears that the Hungarian government has skillfully made minimal
changes to its laws to appease Brussels.176 The core of the Media Laws has remained intact.
The Fidesz government has routinely reverted to noncompliance practices after the
EU and ECJ have intervened. The EU has only targeted individual incidences of
noncompliance with EU law rather than addressing the larger, systemic issues with the
Fidezs governance. Moreover, the EU has been unable to prevent Hungary’s authoritarian
reversal by attacking violations in this isolated manner. The EU needs to comprehensively
address the systemic issues for the organization to stop authoritarian reversals. It is difficult
to comprehensively ascertain why the EU has not been more strict with Hungary and enacted
harsher punishments, even the applying Article 7 to Hungary. A common answer to this
question is that the EU is primarily an economic international organization and does not care
about issues outside the scope of regional fiscal matters. While this may be partially true, this
answer is far too simplistic. A factor that may advance that theory is the democratic nature of
the EU itself. Each country elects members to represent its Member State in the European
Parliament (EP). Representatives in the EP may fear that applying Article 7 to a Member
State may create a precedent that could be applied to their country for similar practices or
other violations of EU law. Further, the EU was not likely prepared to address authoritarian
reversal when it accepted the 2004 accession class, which had eight former communist
Member States. In addition, the series of crises the EU has faced in recent years, including
176
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the 2008 global economic crisis, the perpetual fiscal crisis in Greece, and now the Syrian
refugee crisis, has likely deterred the EU’s attention away from democratic governance
matters. Unfortunately, authoritarian governance by a Member State can create a new crisis
or exacerbate a current crisis, like the fence built by the Fidesz government on the
Hungarian-Serbian border and potential human rights violations inflicted on the Syrian
refugees by Hungarian officers.
In contrast to Hungary, enforcement of Article 2 has more successful in Romania, but
this largely due to different post-accession conditions in these Member States. For the first
time, the EU created a post-accession monitoring and evaluating mechanism to regulate the
progress of Romania and Bulgaria after their accession in 2007. This mechanism is the
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM). The problem, however, is the CVM only
applies to the 2007 accession class, and it was not applied to previous accession classes. The
democratic trajectory of Romania was been greatly influenced by the CVM. The lack of
monitoring and evaluating following Hungary’s accession, which took place just three years
before Romania, has also been a contributing factor to Hungary’s violation of EU
fundamental values and its reversal to authoritarianism. There is not enough evidence to
concretely determine whether the EU has been able to either prevent an authoritarian reversal
or promote democracy in Romania, but the combination of the CVM and issue linkage have
led to increased compliance with EU demands compared to Hungary.
The European Commission decided in December 2006 to apply the CVM to Romania
just prior to its accession the following year.177 The main focus of the CVM has been to
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address rule of law shortcomings in judicial reform and the fight against corruption.178
Article 38 of the European Commission Decision states that this safeguard measure should
not remain in force longer than necessary and may be lifted when the shortcomings are met.
The European Commission Decision set benchmarks for Romania to accomplish:
(1) Ensure a more transparent, and efficient judicial process notable by enhancing the
capacity and accountability of the Superior Council of the Magistracy. Report and
monitor the impact of the new civil and penal procedure codes.
(2) Establish, as foreseen, and integrity agency with responsibilities for verifying
assets, incompatibilities and potential conflicts of interest, and for issuing
mandatory decisions on the basis of which dissuasive sanctions can be taken.
(3) Building on progress already made, continue to conduct professional, nonpartisan investigations into allegation of high-level corruption.
(4) Take further measures to prevent and fight against corruption, in particular within
local government.179
The CVM was originally intended to end three years after accession, but Article 38 allows
the CVM to remain intact as long as these shortcomings persist. As of 2015, eight years after
Romania’s accession, the CVM is still intact.
During the Ponta Government’s impeachment attempt of President Basescu in 2012,
the Constitutional Court was not the only actor who fought the Government. The European
Commission played a crucial role to address the blatant violations of democracy and rule of
law. The Commission decided to intervene and use the July 2012 CVM Report as an
instrument to prevent the crisis from spreading.180 On July 11, 2012, Prime Minister went to
Brussels to explain the political developments to European Parliament President Martin
Schulz and European Commission President José Manuel Barroso. Prime Minister Ponta was
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given an 11-point list with requirements that the Romanian Government was responsible to
provide answers to, reconcile and demonstrate to EU institutions that Romania was
respecting the rule of law and European standards. The list included:
(1) Repeal Emergency Ordinance no. 38/2012 and Emergency Ordinance no.
41/2012;
(2) Ensure that Constitutional Court rulings on the quorum for a referendum and the
scope of the Court’s responsibilities are respected;
(3) Respect constitutional requirements in issuing emergency ordinances in the future;
(4) Implement all the decisions of the Constitutional Court;
(5) Ensure the immediate publication of all acts in the Official Journal, including the
decisions of the Constitutional Court;
(6) Require all political parties and government authorities to respect the
independence of the judiciary; with a commitment to discipline any government or
party member who undermines the credibility of judges or puts pressure on judicial
institutions;
(7) Appoint an Ombudsman enjoying cross-party support, through a transparent and
objective process, leading to the selection of a person with uncontested authority,
integrity and independence;
(8) Introduce a transparent process for the nomination of the General Prosecutor and
Chief Inspector of the National Anti-Corruption Directorate. This should include
open applications based on criteria of professional expertise, integrity and a track
record of anti-corruption action. No nomination should be made under the acting
Presidency;
(9) Avoid any presidential pardons during the acting Presidency;
(10) Refrain from appointing Ministers with integrity rulings against them; Ministers
in that situation should step down;
(11) Adopt clear procedures which require the resignation of Members of Parliament
with final decisions on incompatibility and conflicts of interest, or with final
convictions for high-level corruption.181
The Romanian Government and Prime Minister Ponta responded and the rule of law crisis
was averted, largely due to EU pressures. However, not all of the 11 recommendations have
been thoroughly addressed. The 2013 CVM Report showed that Romania still had not
appointed new leadership to the General Prosecutor’s Office or the Chief Inspector of the
National Anti-Corruption Directorate.
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The CVM also has strength through issue linkage.182 The primary use of issue linkage
against Romania has involved its membership into the Schengen Area. The Schengen Area
was established by the Schengen Agreement in 1985. The Schengen Area does not require
passports or border controls at common borders. During the Soviet era, Romanian citizens
did not have access to freely travel to neighboring countries. Following the collapse of Soviet
control, freedom of movement has a priority for Romania citizens and the Government. The
EU has consistently linked CVM performance in Romania with Schengen membership. The
European Commission used issue linkage with the CVM and Schengen membership to
prevent the Ponta Government’s consolidation of power and preserve the independence of
the Constitutional Court. This issue linkage has also been a key tool for fighting rampant
corruption, which Romanian corruption control bodies are still fighting and will so for years
to come. On multiple occasions, the European Commission has discussed the removal of the
CVM in Romania and Bulgaria.183 Nevertheless, other Member States have obstructed the
CVM removal. Initially, Netherlands and Finland indicated that they would block agreements
until more progress had been made to reform corruption control, judicial reform and the fight
against organized crime in Bulgaria. However, these two Member States did not link CVM
progress Schengen membership. The Member State link between CVM progress and
Schengen membership came from Germany and France following the 2012 Romanian crisis.
The EU cannot use a ‘carrot or stick’ approach to promote governance in line with
EU law and norms in Member States like it does pre-accession. This changed when the CVM
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has been implemented on 2007 accession class, and the EU has not yet been decided whether
Member States candidates, like Turkey, Serbia, Albania, Montenegro, would have a similar
post-accession mechanism if they were granted membership. The future of democracy in
Romania remains unclear, and at times there is little hope. The lack of optimism can be
partially attributed to the EU’s inability to prevent Hungary’s authoritarian reversal. The
democratic deficits in Hungary and Romania are partially a result of the absence of domestic
internalization of EU norms and democratic principles. The punishing nature of economic
sanctions and political pressure promotes temporary compliance not domestic internalization
of EU norms. Domestic internalization of EU norms is essential for compliance and
democratic consolidation.

Member State Internalization of International Law
The presence of an authoritarian Member State in an international organization is not
only a result of weak enforcement mechanisms, but also because the IO’s law and values
have not been internalized by Member States. Signing and ratifying treaties is only the first
step to compliance with international law. It is necessary for states to domestically internalize
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international law for it to become binding.184 The same type of logic applies to accession into
an international organization. Member State accession into an IO is like signing and ratifying
an international treaty. Member States must internalize the IO’s laws as well as adopt the
norms of appropriate behavior for Member States. In the case of the EU, each Member
State’s accession into the Union involved different adjustments—institutionally and
culturally—to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria. Eight-out-of-ten countries in the EU’s
fifth enlargement in 2004 were former Soviet Republics or Soviet-occupied states that
governed under single-party communist dictatorships. Also, both Member States of the 2007
accession class have the same authoritarian history. Since 1989, these states have engaged in
democratic transitions to reshape their government structures and legal systems. The
transitions also required reshaping their cultures to embrace democracy, capitalism, and
Europeanization following their accession to the EU.
Accession into the EU only requires surface level internalization of the Union’s laws
and norms. When a Member State joins the EU, it is required to obey EU laws and treaties.
Member State’s compliance and respect of EU values, like democracy and rule of law, is
further complicated because the EU does not have a set homogenous principles defining
democracy and rule of law for Member States to follow. These values are not clearly defined
by Article 2 or any other treaty. The EU allows leeway for Member States to define these
terms, and the Union handles violations on a case-by-case basis—as seen above in the
enforcement section. During the accession process, candidates must pass the extensive
Copenhagen Criteria. A key component of the Copenhagen Criteria is candidates
demonstrate that they are democratic. In order to prove that the candidate is democratic, they
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must demonstrate that the country has a procedural democracy: elections, rule of law, and a
system of checks and balances. The problem is that procedural democracy does not guarantee
that democracy will continue to exist in the candidate state, especially in transitioning states.
Stealth authoritarianism, particularly in Hungary, portrays how a procedural democracy can
be manipulated and fail to remain democratic. Further, while procedural democratization and
anticipation of Europeanization was successful for many of the former Soviet satellites in the
1990s, EU membership required not just procedural democratization but performance
democratization, which had not yet existed in most of these countries.185
Performance democratization is a progressive step beyond procedural democracy that
entails good governance in areas of civil rights and political liberties, access to information,
government transparency and accountability, and free and fair elections. Several of the
transitioning new Member States had formal-legal democracies at the procedural level, but
democracy had not reached consolidation at the social level. Theoretically, the EU assumed
that accession would lead to formal-legal democracy in Member States as well as domestic
internalization of EU laws and values into the society of each Member State. Despite partial
institutional internalization of democracy, several societies in these former communist
Member States have not yet internalized EU democracy and rule of law norms. The lack of
internalization is particularly transparent in states with democratic deficiencies. It is
imperative that norms are internalized both culturally and institutionally for long-term
compliance. If there is a void in either side of the coin, the probability for full internalization
is tremendously damaged.
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In both Romania and Hungary, EU democracy and rule of law norms have not been
fully adopted culturally. This can be greatly attributed to each country’s Soviet past, but this
is not the only explanation. First of all, democratization and internalization take time and
patience. Hungary has been an EU member for hardly a decade, and Romania has been a
member for even less time. Throughout each country’s democratic transition, societal trust in
public officials and democratic institutions has wavered. To make matters worse, the 2008
global economic crisis obstructed cultural internalization of EU democratic norms. The crisis
has had devastating effects on both of these countries, which were not only transitioning
democratically but also economically. The economic struggles led to public skepticism of
both democracy and the EU. It is first necessary to observe how their Soviet histories have
affected each state’s current government and legal systems.
Soviet legal systems were implanted in Hungary and Romania during their Soviet
occupations. Each country’s current government structure and legal system, as well as the
public’s perceptions of these institutions, has been influenced by their Soviet pasts. Soviet
law was unlike any other law. Soviet law was based off of the Marxism-Leninism doctrine,
and it was “a doctrine to be accepted as indisputable truth.”186 Leaders, jurists and
administrators in this legal system relied on Marxism-Leninism as their guide to interpret
law. Marxism-Leninism doctrine believes that the exploitation of man by man was an
inescapable result of private ownership. Rather than establishing a legal order for resolving
disputes, Soviet law’s sole priority was to transform society towards the communist ideal—a
fraternal society that is free of exploitation of man by man, and each person will work for the
community according to his or her ability and will receive from the community according to
David, René & Brierley, John. Major Legal Systems in the World Today, 2nd Ed. New York: The
Free Press, 155 (1978).
186
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his or her needs.187 Soviet law was characterized by its economic and class preoccupations.
Even though Soviet proponents considered Soviet society to be flawed, they still considered
it to be far superior to capitalist societies. Since they knew their society were flawed, Soviet
states were in a constant state a revolution in order to reach the final state of communism.
Therefore, Soviets gave governments all the power they needed to reach the communist
ideal, which resulted in authoritarian governance.
There were three tasks of the Soviet government and law. First, national security of
Soviet states and republics required that the power of the state to be consolidated into the
hands of a few key officials and increased so enemies of socialism were discouraged from
attacking Soviet regimes, which would ensure peace between states. The second task, which
was economic, was to develop production based on socialist principles to create abundances
so everyone could be provided with what they need. The third task was educational and
sought to rid man of selfish tendencies and anti-social behavior that have been caused by a
legacy of poor economic organization.188 Outside of Russia, the Soviet republics and satellite
states were removed of all their previously existing laws, except for those that were in
accordance with Soviet principles. Certain states, however, resisted the Soviet takeover. In
1956, Hungarian workers and peasants rebelled against the Soviet-supported communist
state. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution lasted only a few weeks and was ultimately
suppressed by Soviet troops. Behind Alexander Dubcek’s leadership, Czechoslovakia’s 1968
Prague Spring attempted to liberalize the Soviet-supported state. The revolt was quashed in
August of that year after the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact Members invaded
Czechoslovakia. As the Soviet Union’s control over Central and Eastern Europe was
187
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collapsing in the late 1980s, the Romanian Revolution successfully ended the Sovietoccupation as revolutionary actors killed President Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife. The
National Salvation Front and Ion Iliescu took control of Romania shortly after.
The Soviet legal history has left its mark on Hungary and Romania. The purpose of
law under this system was not individualistic and wasn’t used to resolve disputes. Rather, the
purpose of Soviet law was communal—in the Marxist-Leninist sense. Citizens did not use
the legal system to resolve disputes or challenge the government. Due to the single-party,
communist government structure and lack of separation of powers, judicial review was nonexistent. The consolidation of great amounts of power into the hands of a few government
officials greatly affected the role of the ordinary citizenry. Generally, ordinary citizens were
subservient to those in powers, they did not participate in politics, and citizens did not
challenge the government, except for a few instances of revolution and protest. This also led
to distrust of public institutions and state actors. Distrust only grew when Soviet-supported
governments began to control the media and increased surveillance over citizens following
the attempted Hungarian Revolution in 1956.
During Hungary and Romania’s democratic transitions, they had to reconfigure their
government structures, institutional powers and legal systems. Hungary changed nearly every
word of its Soviet-era Constitution (Law XX of 1949) with the 1989 amendments. Romania
decided to draft a new constitution that was passed by a popular referendum in 1991. Even
though each state had a new constitution that aimed to build democracy and rule of law, as
the revolutionary fervor calmed toward the mid-1990s, the fragile post-communist societies
needed to culturally adapt to democratic governance to legitimize the transition.

98
Distrust for public institutions has remained strong in Hungary and Romania. This
distrust is often justified due to the rampant corruption in both countries. Yet, there are
exceptions to this rule. Public opinions polls in the late 1990s showed that Hungarians
considered the Constitutional Court to be the most highly respected political institution in
Hungary after the Court opened in January 1990.189 The high regard for Hungary’s
Constitutional Court is greatly due to actio popularis, which provided any citizen standing to
challenge any law before the Court. The reputation of the Court has since been damaged due
to the Fidesz government’s actions to control it. The value of the Romania Constitutional
Court, which has fought for democracy in several instances, has frequently been questioned.
The Romanian legal culture has been heavily influenced by the Soviet era. The cultural norm
is not use the legal system to resolve disputes or challenge the government. Instead, Romania
has placed this duty in the hands of Parliament. The Romanian public and politicians have
consistently questioned the necessity of its Constitutional Court as well as the entire judicial
system.
Romania’s Constitutional Court did not have the final arbiter powers over
constitutional disputes until these powers were granted to the Court with the 2003
amendments. The Court’s role in the democratization process throughout the 1990s and early
2000s was minimal if not irrelevant. In a 1997 interview, President of the Romanian
Constitutional Court Ion Muraru said, “[i]n our country, in the Constituent Assembly, it was
hard to convince even the lawyers that we needed a distinct authority of the sort.”190 In 2013,
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Romania attempted to amend its Constitution again. Reduction and definition of the
Constitutional Court’s powers was a high priority. Romania’s Constitution, however, was not
amended when Parliament could not reach an agreement. The limited faith in the efficacy of
the Constitutional Court is likely conflated by the public’s distrust of the ordinary courts.
Several judges, magistrates and prosecutors from Romania’s ordinary courts have been
charged with corruption. Opinion polls have consistently shown that the public considers
legal institutions and professionals to be corrupt, and that the judiciary is politicized, which
leads to flawed administration of justice. 191
In recent years, the Hungarian and Romanian public have come to believe that
democracy has not performed well in both countries—for good reason.192 While civic
participation has fluctuated in Hungary since its democratic transition, civic participation in
Romania has been nearly nonexistent over the past 25 years. Civic involvement in politics
and democracy has historically remained low in Romania, primarily because of contempt for
the government officials. The complicated political processes that sections of the population
are unable to fully comprehend, the public and civil society’s inability to intervene in
democratic practices and policies due to the political factions strongholds, and distrust of
public institutions due to rampant corruption have also prevented civic participation.193 While
public perceptions of democratic performance in both Member States have remained low, the
2008 global economic crisis further damaged the public’s perception that democracy can
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function effectively in their countries. Hungarian and Romanian citizens placed much of the
blame for their economics woes on democracy and the EU after the global economic crisis.
Hungary and Romania recently became EU members prior to the 2008 economic
crisis. This crisis derailed the cultural internalization of EU norms. The crisis hit
underdeveloped EU Member States especially hard because of their intra-EU division of
labor role to produce low-skill products, whereas more advanced economics, like Germany
and Nordic countries, have ‘knowledge economies’ that focus on technology and finance.194
In relation to other Member States, Hungary and Romania are both considered to be
underdeveloped. The 2008 crisis caused slower growth, social mobility to reverse, and
populism, isolationism, and nationalism to increase in popularity in many underdeveloped
EU Member States.195 Slower growth has led to reduced private consumption and
investment, less public spending and austerity programs. As Hungary and Romania became
Member States, they anticipated that EU membership would provide them with Western
European-type welfare safety nets. Instead, they received public spending cuts and austerity
measures. The lower-middle class was first hit by the crisis. The lower-middle class rose
from the lower class due to new jobs and access to credit after the communist era ended, but
the crisis pushed this class back down. This has caused the already stretched social welfare
programs to be further stretched. The traditionally poor were also negatively affected,
because the austerity measures led to cuts in public social welfare spending that has already
been stretched thin. Finally, the young adult sector of the population was negatively affected
because this group could not find jobs, even after graduating from universities. The economic
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crisis created social and economic tensions. The result of these tensions has been to look
inward for solutions; therefore, stoking ardent nationalism, populism and protectionism in
some states. Citizens in these states that were hit hardest by the economic crisis have been
the most likely to become anti-democracy and anti-EU. In 1991, 74 percent of the Hungarian
population approved of the change to democracy, but the approval rating dropped to 56
percent in 2009.196 In addition, a 2009 study showed over 70 percent of Hungarians polled
said that they were better off during communism.197 Hungarian citizens did not have faith in
democratic governance or EU-type democracy. Conditions were perfect for the populist
Fidesz party to grab power and create a new, anti-democratic (authoritarian) government.
The 2010 Parliamentary election in Hungary was a free and fair election that was not
manipulated by the Fidesz party or any other party. It was simply a democratic response by
the Hungarian voters. The election of the Fidesz government in 2010 was a response by the
Hungarian public to the poor economic situation and the party’s populist, nationalist, and
isolationist agenda. Before Viktor Orbán and the Fidesz party gained their supermajority,
they attacked the social-democratic party’s (MszP) Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány and
forced his resignation in 2009. During a speech given at an MszP party meeting in 2006,
which was intended to be confidential, Prime Minister Gyurcsány said that he had been lying
for over a year and a half about the economic situation in Hungary in order to win elections a
few months earlier. After a recording of the speech was later leaked to Hungary’s state radio,
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Orbán and Fidez members began to call for Gyurcsány’s resignation. Protests broke out and
continued in Budapest until Gyurcsány finally resigned.
Economic crises often lead to public leanings toward the conservative right of the
political spectrum, and Gyurcsány’s actions exacerbated the collapse of Hungary’s political
left. The public’s fear and desire for a solution to the economic crisis resulted in electing a
populist and nationalistic government that ran on a platform that opposed liberal democracy
and the EU. In a 2009 speech in the Kötcse village, Orbán blamed Hungary’s situation on the
bipolar political system, and called for this system to vanish and be replaced a by center-field
political power to take its place—a single party state.198 Orbán obviously saw himself as the
single party state’s leader. Rhetoric that the 1989 transition was an ‘insufficient transition’ or
a ‘stolen transition’ began to gain traction in Hungary at this time. The Fidesz party ran on a
nationalist, anti-EU platform. Despite Orbán’s role in the democratic transition in 1989,
Orbán promised to “transition the transition.” In 2010, the center-right Fidesz party and far
right Jobbik party combined to win 70 percent of the vote.199 The Fidesz party’s vision for
Hungary’s ‘second transition’ is a strong, unified nation-state with ideological foundations
rooted in anti-modernism in which Europe has become decadent and should return to its
Christian roots, and Hungary should return to its traditional Christian roots. The result of this
‘second transition’ has demolished democratic governance and rule of law in Hungary. There
has been a tremendous regression in the internalization process of EU norms in Hungary’s
institutions. The Fidesz agenda has been so deeply entrenched into government institutions
198
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that it would be incredibly difficult for the public to require institutional compliance even if
democratic and EU values do become the cultural norm in Hungary.
Romania did not experience the same right-wing nationalism and populism that
Hungary and several other European states embraced following the economic crisis. The
majority coalition in Romania has been consistently held by Romania’s left side of the
political spectrum. Nevertheless, the crisis created further political turmoil in the already
turbulent political arena. Romania’s underdeveloped economy was vulnerable prior to the
2008 crisis. The domestic economic crisis that followed led the Government to negotiate and
accept a 13 billion Euro IMF-EU-World Bank loan in March 2009. However, the loan had a
conditionality that reduced public spending, which led to implementing austerity measures.
Public sector wages were cut by 25 percent and many extra-benefits were cut, 200,000 public
employees were laid off between 2009 and 2011, government agencies were restructured,
health insurance became taxed, unemployment and child benefits were cut by 15 percent, and
several state enterprises were privatized.200 None of the most unpopular measures, however,
were implemented until after the 2009 presidential election.
After President Basescu was reelected, he began to push for implementing these
austerity measures. In June 2010, Prime Minister Boc and his Cabinet implemented the 25
percent public sector wage cut, the health insurance tax, and 15 percent cut in social security.
These austerity measures infuriated the public that was already suffering from the effects of
the crisis. Prime Minister Boc and his Cabinet were later forced out of office in 2012 after a
series of protests. The perpetually inactive citizenry took to the streets in Bucharest and
protested the Government’s austerity measures. It was not just austerity measures that they
200
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were protesting, however. The citizenry linked the austerity measures to their discontent with
those in power and the endless corruption. Whether or not the population believes in
democratic principles remains in question. Regardless, a strong majority of the population
believes that democracy has not worked in Romania due to poor democratic performance by
public officials and institutions, primary due to corruption.
Despite some instances of successful EU democratic and rule of law norm
internalization, these norms have not been culturally internalized into either Member State’s
domestic society. Until there is cultural internalization, the institutions that promote and
ensure democracy and rule of law will not be held accountable and required to ensure that
these norms are respected. The 2008 economic crisis was a tremendous setback for the
cultural internalization process. In Hungary, the crisis sparked the public dismissal of
democracy and the EU that led to the decline towards authoritarianism. The crisis
exacerbated the Romanian public’s derisive attitude toward its government and further
postponed acceptance that the country can be ruled democratically.

Conclusions
To answer the central the question—under which conditions does an authoritarian
Member State exist in an international organization that requires democratic governance in
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its treaty law—this thesis examined the Member State from multiple angles. First, this thesis
began from the perspective of the Member State to comprehend how a Member State might
construct an authoritarian government despite an IO’s legal requirement for democratic
governance. Next, the perspective from the IO observed the EU’s enforcement mechanisms
and its response to undemocratic governance. The final section employed the vantage point
of the Member State’s domestic society. This thesis aimed to answer why a Member State
would not only violate IO treaty law and norms, but also revert to authoritarianism by
investigating cultural internalization of IO norms and democratic principles.
This thesis found that Hungary not only employed all the components of stealth
authoritarianism, but the Member State has also experienced an authoritarian reversal and
should be labeled as an authoritarian regime. Application of stealth authoritarian theory to
Romania has provided tremendous context to the theory. Romania suffers from severe
democratic deficits due to rampant corruption and a weak ordinary judiciary, but the Member
State cannot be classified as authoritarian. Despite efforts made by former Prime Minister
Ponta, neither the President nor the Prime Minister has been able to consolidate its power and
effectively remove formal checks against their authority. The Constitutional Court has
maintained its independence and demonstrated its strength as it battled Ponta’s efforts to
eliminate its judicial review powers. The consistent changes in political leadership and
perpetual political turmoil have also prevented one faction from gaining an authoritarian
foothold.
Comparison of these case studies shows that a stealth authoritarian regime must
be able to consolidate power into the executive branch and remove formal checks from
the legislative and judicial branches in order to start working towards packing informal
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institutions, controlling the media, ensuring ruling party victories in elections and
weakening civil society. There were two primary factors—one internal and one
external— that influenced the differing outcomes in Hungary and Romania: the checks
created by the structure of governmental branches and the EU’s Cooperation and
Verification Mechanism (CVM).
The weak separation of powers between branches and limited checks against the
executive branch in Hungary’s government structure is a major factor for its authoritarian
reversal. The separation between the executive and legislative branch is almost nonexistent.
The judiciary, the Constitutional Court, is an essential check against these branches. Once
the Fidesz government constructed its legal authority with the Fundamental Law, the
government used its supermajority in Parliament to dominate and control the judicial branch.
After a long battle with the Constitutional Court, Prime Minister Orbán and the Fidesz
Parliament eliminated the judicial check against its power and continued to pack the Court
with Fidesz loyalists. Currently, the Fidesz government has appointed the majority of the
Court’s justices. Also, the Court does not have substantial judicial review powers that could
potentially block the Prime Minister and Parliament’s overextension of powers beyond those
found in the Fundamental Law. Once the formal checks against the power centralized into
Prime Minister Orbán’s hands were eliminated, the Fidesz government could then begin to
pack informal institutions with loyalists and expand the powers of these bureaucratic
agencies, control the media, reconfigure election and campaign laws to ensure the Fidesz
government maintained its power and principal authoritarian tool—its supermajority.
The structure of Romania’s government is far more complex and has several more
checks than Hungary’s structure. The Fidesz government only needed to eliminate the
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judicial branch’s formal check to consolidate its power into the Prime Minister’s hands.
However, Romania’s structure has a two-headed executive branch and a bicameral
Parliament in addition to Romania’s Constitutional Court. First, the President of Romania has
far more powers than the ceremonial President of Hungary. The President of Romania has
expansive powers, similar to the President of the U.S. In contrast, Hungary’s President has
only a few minor powers, which includes veto authority over bills passed in Parliament.
Romania’s President is also elected rather than appointed by the majority in Parliament. The
Romanian President has constantly battled the Prime Minister for executive branch control,
but neither has been able to consolidate power into their office since Nicolae Ceausescu’s
assassination, which marked the start of the democratic transition.
In addition to the extra presidential check in Romania, its Constitutional Court has
been able to maintain its independence and strength. This is largely due to the selection
process of the Court’s justices and their term limits. The Court is comprised of nine justices
that serve nine-year terms, which cannot be prolonged or renewed. Three justices are
appointed by the Chamber of Deputies, three by the Senate and three by the President. The
Constitutional Court renews three justices every three years. The selection process and term
limits reduce one faction or branch’s ability to pack the Court, because the selection process
involves input from several institutions. Also, the composition the Court changes every three
years. Hungary’s Constitutional Court was far easier for the Fidesz government to pack.
First, justices are nominated by a vote in Parliament and confirmed by the President’s
signature. Because the majority in Parliament chooses the Hungarian President, there is not a
legitimate separation between these branches. The Fidesz Parliament used its supermajority
to change the rules for nominating justices and removed the requirement for input from
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oppositional parties in Parliament. Next, Parliament changed the law to increase the number
of justices from 11 to 15. Finally, the retirement age for justices, rather than term limits,
allows Hungary’s authoritarian government an additional means to pack the Constitutional
Court in comparison to Romania. Each Member State’s current leadership did not create the
initial design of their government structure. These structures were assembled as the countries
transitioned to democracy in 1989. Authoritarian reversals and stealth authoritarianism
require maneuvering through the institutions in place. Moreover, Hungary’s governmental
structure has proven far easier to work through for leaders with authoritarian goals.
Recognition of these weaknesses should be considered by democratizing states. International
organizations should also consider this point for pre-accession conditionality as well as
assessment for which institutions to protect to prevent authoritarian reversals.
The public’s ability to influence the government’s actions has also been a primary
difference between Hungary and Romania. There have been several large protests in
Budapest, Hungary, over the past five years, but most of them have been inconsequential.
Initially, it appeared that the Internet tax protest in October 2014 was successful when the
Hungarian Parliament decided to not pass the tax. However, several prominent members of
Hungary’s civil society contend that the Fidesz Parliament never planned to pass the Internet
tax, and it was only created to distract the public from other bills Parliament was in the
process of enacting that would be publicly unfavorable.201 In addition to not satisfying all the
components of stealth authoritarian, the Romanian public’s ability to persuade its leaders
with protests further demonstrates that the Member State cannot be considered authoritarian.
The nightclub fire protests in Bucharest led to Prime Minister Ponta’s resignation, who was
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the main Romanian leader that threatened to push Romanian toward authoritarianism. The
protests also gave civil society groups a seat at the table to select the new Prime Minister,
which was unprecedented. Authoritarian governments generally do not respond to the public
will, and if they do so, it is likely to be an inconsequential concession, like the Internet tax in
Hungary.
The other key difference that has been influential for the state of democracy in
Hungary and Romania is external—the EU’s Cooperation and Verification Mechanism
(CVM). The EU’s mechanisms to enforce its law and safeguard democracy—economic
sanctions, political pressures, infringement procedures, and Article 7—have been overall
ineffective to counteract and prevent undemocratic practices by Hungary and Romania’s
governments. The CVM, however, has been a powerful tool for the EU in Romania. The
problem is that the CVM was only applied to the 2007 accession class (Romania and
Bulgaria), and there are no institutional monitoring mechanisms for the other formerauthoritarian Member States, including Hungary. The CVM has been monitoring severe
democratic deficiencies in Romania since it became a Member State in 2007. Because of the
constant monitoring and evaluation of a Member State’s democratic progress, it would be
incredibly difficult for a stealth authoritarian regime to slip past the CVM. The lack of
monitoring in Hungary is a key point of difference between the two Member States that has
affected their democratic outcomes.
The CVM has been used as a leverage tool to coerce compliance in Romania.
Authoritarian crises have been appeased in this Member State after EU officials utilized the
CVM as a tool for leverage with issue linkage. The EU has primarily tied the CVM with
membership into the Schengen Treaty, which would allow Romania to enter the EU’s free
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movement zone without passports or any constraints. Schengen Membership is especially
important to former Soviet-occupied Member States. During the Soviet-occupation,
Romanian citizens were not able to travel freely to neighboring countries without going
through exhaustive bureaucratic processes. The CVM has promoted democracy in Romania
as well as pacified authoritarian crises. However, there is still no conclusive evidence that the
EU can prevent an authoritarian reversal in Romania if a faction can garner enough strength.
This doubt arises primarily because of the EU’s inability to prevent Hungary’s authoritarian
reversal.
The final component addressing the central question pertains to a Member State’s
domestic culture and internalization of EU democratic norms. Both countries have legal
systems and institutions that have been greatly influenced by their Soviet pasts. The reason
why Hungary has reverted to authoritarian and why Romania has not fully consolidated to
democracy is because their cultures are still skeptical of democracy and EU norms. Both
Member States had just joined the EU prior to the 2008 global economic crisis. This crisis
hindered the norm internalization process. Hungarian and Romanian citizens believed that
the EU would provide a social welfare safety net in the case of an economic crisis, which
their respective governments no longer provided after communism. The EU was unable to
genuinely help those in need when the 2008 economic crisis eliminated jobs, cut wages, and
in some cases increased taxes. Democracy and EU norms had also not yet been internalized
into Romania’s culture. The 2008 crisis was yet another chapter of the Romanian
population’s distrust of public officials’ ability to provide them with a legitimate democracy.
The public blamed the austerity measures that resulted from the crisis on institutional
corruption. Political turmoil broke out again with civic protests and the removal of yet
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another Prime Minister and his Government. Romania has not culturally internalized the
EU’s democratic norms because of the poor democratic performance by government officials
and institutions. Until Romania has culturally internalized democracy and EU legal norms
and demand them as the appropriate standard of behavior for its leadership and institutions,
Romania will remain in a state of transition rather than democratic consolidation. Therefore,
Romania will remain in greater peril of reverting to authoritarianism. Due to the EU’s
inability to prevent Hungary’s reversal, this is a grave concern.
In Hungary, a large percentage of the citizenry, especially those most affected by the
crisis, began to blame their economic woes on democracy and the EU. They called for a
government that promoted nationalism, isolation, and protectionism. As a result, the
Hungarians elected the Fidesz government to a supermajority in 2010, because this party ran
a populist platform that the citizenry was demanding. From there, the Fidesz government
reverted to authoritarianism, partially with the will of the people. However, it is safe to
estimate by the 2014 election results that approval of the Fidesz government is shrinking.
The problem is that the Fidesz government has so entrenched its authoritarian regime into
Hungary that the voters will likely not be able to remove this government without extreme
measures, like a revolution. Stealth authoritarianism in the EU may resurge in other
transitioning Member States with the Syrian Civil War refugee crisis.
The Syrian refugee crisis hit Europe this summer (2015), and it appeared that EU and
its Member States were ill prepared. Hungary is one of the first entry point into the EU’s free
movement zone as it is located in the Union’s south-east corner. Hungary’s populist,
nationalist response to the refugee crisis began with a billboard campaign sponsored by the
Fidesz government. Billboards were placed throughout Hungary that contained populist
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messages, including “If you come to Hungary, don’t take the jobs of Hungarians!” and “If
you come to Hungary, you have to keep our laws!”202 The problem was that these billboards
were written in Hungarian, and the Syrian refugees could not read them. It seems that these
billboards were actually created to stir up populist fervor against immigration and Syrian
refugees. As the number of Syrian refugees attempting to enter Hungary increased,
Hungary’s isolationist response was to build a fence on Hungary’s border with Serbia and
Croatia. There have been several allegations of human rights violations for spraying refugees
and journalists with tear gas and imprisoning refugees. The Fidesz government even passed a
law that made it illegal for refugees to enter Hungary without permission. As a result,
thousands of refugees were imprisoned. This crisis has created fear and panic not only in
Hungary but also throughout Europe.
Further research on stealth authoritarian, international organizations and the effects of
crises on transitioning Member States can be conducted on the developing situation in
Poland. Poland, which was in the 2004 EU accession class with Hungary, may be the next
former-communist EU Member State to employ stealth authoritarianism. Poland’s voters
have responded to the refugee crisis in Europe by electing a populist and nationalist
government. After spending the past eight years as a minority party, the right-wing populist
Law and Justice party (PiS) won a majority in Parliament in November 2015. Law and
Justice party leader, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, is an admirer of Viktór Orbán and his idea of
illiberal governance. The PiS party campaigned on a populist platform, which included
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opposition to gay rights and fear of Muslims.203 PiS leadership has began to enact practices
similar to those of the Fidesz government. There have been two major offenses against
democracy and rule of law in just first few weeks of the PiS government’s leadership. First,
the independence of the Constitutional Court was threatened when the President Andrzej
Duda, who was a former member of the PiS party, refused to swear in five new judges who
were selected by the previous Parliament. The PiS Parliament has also amended the
Constitution to void the election of judges by previous Parliaments.204 The second major
offense came from a presidential pardon. President Duda pardoned the head of the
Anticorruption Bureau, who was accused of abusing his power, before the Court issued its
final decision. These actions have caused several Polish and international legal scholars to
label Poland as a state that is no longer governed by rule of law. There is also fear that a
constitutional coup is occurring in Poland.205 The new government has also changed the
appointment process for the heads of the public media by the President and Parliament. As of
December 2015, the PiS government is only in its second month of power. The situation in
Poland and the EU response to undemocratic practices should be watched closely and further
researched.
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